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An Examination of National Park Service Decision Making: A Case 
Study of Grant Village, Yellowstone National Park 
The policy process of any government agency involves many 
participants representing diverse interests. The participants 
involved in the national park policy process have not only caused 
many changes in park policy through the years, but have also 
caused an evolution in the philosophical basis upon which that 
policy is founded. The anthropocentric philosophy, which places 
primary emphasis on providing recreation, dominated national park 
management after World War II, but because of public pressure on 
the National Park Service, seems to have given way to the 
biocentric philosophy, which places primary emphasis on preserving 
naturally occurring environmental processes. 
This study first reviews the history of the national parks with 
the objective of tracing the evolution of park policy and the 
changes in its philosophical basis. The study then examines as a 
case study a specific visitor facilities development, Grant 
Village, in Yellowstone National Park which has been under 
construction through the time of the major shift in National Park 
Service philosophy from extreme anthropocentrism to biocentrism. 
The development has been controversial for several reasons; one 
of the most important is that it is seen by many people to be an 
outdated response to increasing visitation because it provides 
convenience-oriented facilities characteristic of the 
anthropocentric era of management. The Park Service, on the other 
hand, insists that completion of the project will accomplish the 
biocentric goals of replacing other facilities in fragile thermal 
areas and grizzly bear habitat. Critics of the development, 
however, argue that the tradeoff is an unfavorable one with 
questionable ecological benefits. 
Biocentrism seems to be the appropriate basis for future park 
policy because it recognizes the importance of preserving complex 
ecological processes to the recreational visitor's experience. 
Examination of Grant Village within the context of this philosophy 
indicates that the Park Service needs to openly adopt biocentrism 
as its basis for policy. Once that is done the agency must choose 
the clientele it will seek to serve. In order for the choice to 
be effective, the parks need Congress to strengthen the laws under 
which the Service operates. 
Director: Stephen F. McCool 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
EXPLANATION OF THE STUDY 
INTRODUCTION 
For any agency of the federal government the formation and 
implementation of policy is a complex process involving many 
participants from both within and outside the government. These 
participants can be constituency groups, public interest groups, forces 
within the involved agency, other governmental agencies, Congress, the 
president and his cabinet, the judicial branch, and even state 
governments. Frequently their effects on policy are not easily 
discernable in the process; motives and actions are often unclear, 
unspecified, or consciously concealed. These participants can 
facilitate, hinder, or even block the formation and implementation of an 
agency's policy. 
Federal land management agencies in particular experience a wide 
variety of participants in their policy process. These agencies manage 
millions of acres, primarily in the western states and Alaska. The USDA 
Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the US Fish and 
Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service (NPS) are the major 
federal land managers. Decisions made by them concerning industrial and 
agricultural uses of the land (timber, grazing, mining), as well as 
recreational uses (boating, hunting, hiking, tourism), can have 
tremendous local and regional economic impacts. For this reason diverse 
groups work to influence policy decisions in favor of their particular 
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interests. 
These agencies are often mandated by law to manage the lands for a 
wide variety of uses that are frequently seen as conflicting by user 
groups. For example, the Forest Service is instructed by the Multiple 
Use- Sustained Yield Act (16 U.S.C. 528-531) to manage each national 
forest equally for wildlife, livestock grazing, recreation, timber 
production, and watershed proctection. The BLM manages primarily for 
grazing, mining, and recreation. Additionally, both agencies, as well 
as the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service, are mandated by 
the Wilderness Act of 1964 (16 U.S.C. 1131-1136) to manage legally 
designated wilderness within lands under their respective jurisdictions. 
This multiple use management presents inherent user conflicts. 
Perhaps one federal land management agency more than any other is 
faced with dealing with a wide assortment of participants in its policy 
process. The National Park Service is charged with the responsibility 
of managing national parks, monuments, recreation areas, historic sites, 
national capital parks, parkways, seashores and lakeshores, scenic 
riverways, historic landmarks, and one park for the performing arts 
(Lee, 1974). The diversity of lands under its control requires the NPS 
to operate under a wide-ranging set of management policies that critics 
say cloud the original purpose of each type of unit in the system. 
Also, lands managed by the NPS are the most visible of all federal 
lands. They are located in almost every state, frequently in or near 
major cities, and by 1982 recreational visits to these areas had reached 
245 million per year (USDI, 1983). 
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Of the lands managed by the NPS, the national parks arguably have 
the largest and most vocal group of participants in their decision 
making process (For the purposes of this study, the term "national 
parks" will refer to those units in the national park system officially 
called national parks, as well as national monuments which contain large 
segments of pristine backcountry). One reason for this intensity and 
diversity of participants is that the parks are the oldest type of unit 
in the system, and through the years have become the best known. Parks 
such as Yosemite, Yellowstone, and the Grand Canyon are known worldwide 
and are often referred to as the "crown jewels" of America; because of 
their popularity, people from around the world share an interest in 
their management. Another reason is that the parks have been 
established individually through the years since 1872, each with its own 
organic act. Frequently, provisions in some of these acts allow uses in 
a particular park (such as grazing, hunting, or mining) that are 
generally contrary to NPS policy. A third reason is that several of the 
parks were established before the Park Service was created, and 
therefore policy development in those parks was originally 
uncoordinated; often practices begun in that era continue to exist in 
those parks in spite of contradictory NPS policy. A fourth reason is 
that the NPS, when created, was given an ambiguous mandate by Congress 
(the National Park Service Act of 1916; 16 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) to 
provide for use of the parks as well as to preserve them. 
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All these reasons contribute to very active interactions in the 
national park policy process, but perhaps the center of all park 
disputes is the vague mandate of the National Park Service Act. The 
meaning of the Act is subject to a wide range of interpretations, and 
Hendee et al. (1978) assert that "[t]he ambiquity inherent in the 
National Park Service Act has been a source of extensive commentary and 
still more extensive agony for subsequent park managers". Indeed, the 
mandate to preserve the parklands while at the same time providing for 
their use by the public forces NPS managers to strike a balance between 
the two seemingly diametrically opposed goals, and an argument can be 
made that practically all problems in national park management revolve 
around the "preservation versus use" issue, as the mandate has come to 
be called. Since any use by the public will impair a natural 
environment to some extent, complete preservation is impossible. 
Therefore, the question NPS administrators face is one of degrees: How 
much change in the natural resources of the parks will be tolerated in 
order to allow the public to make use of the parks? The logical 
follow-up to that question is: What levels and types of use can be 
allowed which will provide the visitor the experiences he desires from a 
national park and yet still afford the preservation of the essential 
aspects which made the park worthy of establishment? 
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THE CHOICE OF A MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY 
The philosophical approach through which to achieve those dual 
goals has been left to the discretion of the agency. Hendee et al. 
(1978) propose and define two primary philosophical approaches to 
wilderness management, both of which can be expanded to apply to 
national park management. According to them, one is anthropocentrism, 
the other is biocentrism. The anthropocentric approach takes the 
"benefit and enjoyment of the people" phrase from the Yellowstone Act 
(16 U.S.C. 21-22), the "promote and regulate use" phrase of the 
National Park Service Act, and the "use and enjoyment" phrase of the 
Wilderness Act literally. Increasing the public's direct use and thus 
increasing human values and benefits is the primary concern of managers 
choosing this approach; sociological considerations and cultural 
definitions take precedence over biological concepts (Hendee and 
Stankey, 1973). Convenience-oriented styles of recreation are 
facilitated, and "[b]ecause the production of recreational experiences 
is a primary goal, actions to increase access, to reduce difficulty and 
danger, and to facilitate use would be encouraged" (Hendee et al., 
1978). Those environmental conditions most pleasing to the majority of 
users are aided by managerial actions. 
On the other hand, Hendee et al. (1978) define the biocentric 
approach as one which "places primary emphasis on preservation of the 
natural order", and where "recreational use is secondary to maintenance 
of the natural order". Managers favoring this approach allow naturally 
evolving environmental processes (erosion, fire, etc.) to proceed to the 
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maximum extent possible. Because of the values, including recreational 
and scientific, placed on the preservation of those processes, certain 
benefits will then accrue to society (Hendee and Stankey, 1973). 
Control of visitor behavior in order to protect the naturalness of the 
area is emphasized rather than control of environmental conditions. 
The primary difference between the two approaches is the "extent to 
which...[human] benefits are viewed as being dependent on the 
naturalness" of the managed area (Hendee et al., 1978). The 
anthropocentric approach asserts that naturalness is of little 
importance to the visitor's experience, and therefore permits 
manipulation of the environment to meet visitor demands and thus provide 
benefits; the biocentric approach advocates manipulation of visitor 
behavior in order to preserve natural conditions which lead to desired 
benefits. Hence, both approaches seek to provide similar benefits 
through the use of different management actions. 
As Hendee et al. (1978) point out, purely anthropocentric and 
purely biocentric philosophies are at opposite ends of a continuum of 
management orientations. Interest groups at both ends of the continuum 
work to influence policy, and Nash (1982) called the debate between the 
two opposing philosophical viewpoints "[o]ne of the most sensitive 
issues in wilderness management". Actual policies for a park or 
wilderness may be a compromise between the two philosophies and 
therefore be a combination of them which lies somewhere along the 
continuum between the two polar extremes. The use of these 
terms—anthropocentrism and biocentrism—with respect to resource 
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management was begun only recently. Historically, the choice of a 
philosophical approach to land management has been unarticulated and can 
only be inferred by studying statements and policies issued during the 
time period in question. Thus, determining the exact point at which a 
particular policy lies on the continuum is an arbitrary decision, and it 
is therefore more useful to point out relative differences in the 
philosophical orientation of policies in question. 
Aspects of both philosophies abound in national park management. 
Park managers may utilize biocentric manipulations such as restricting 
or limiting backcountry use, eliminating exotic species, and allowing 
natural fluctuations in wildlife populations, while in the same park 
such anthropocentric policies as fire suppression and encouragement of 
convenience-oriented camping and lodging may be advocated. Frequently 
the degree to which either an anthropocentric or biocentric approach is 
utilized varies from park to park, depending upon each park's particular 
traditions, history, administration, and political environment. The 
political environment is particularly important because each park has 
its own unique set of political forces which exert a substantial amount 
of pressure on that park's policy process in order to push policies 
toward the philosophical approach they favor. 
A HISTORICAL REVIEW 
The first part of this study will examine the history of national 
park policy within the context of the management philosophy continuum, 
and will identify relative changes in the philosophical orientation of 
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policy as it evolved through the years. The participants who were most 
responsible for the shifts in philosophy will also be identified, and 
their roles in affecting those shifts will be examined. This review 
will be done in order to build a basis of understanding for closer 
examination of a case study of national park policy. 
THE CASE STUDY 
Following the historical review, the study will examine a 
particular visitor facilities development in a major national park as a 
case study of the forces at work in the park level policy process. 
According to Gilbert (1971), "The case study approach to analysis and 
learning is widely acclaimed by educators. Reading about an actual 
event and the chronological happenings that took place gives the 
student...an insight into the planning, or lack of it, and the results 
that followed". 
The Grant Village project in Yellowstone National Park will be used 
as the case study. It is a very controversial visitor facilities 
development that was first conceived in the 1930s, and construction 
which was begun in the 1950s is not yet completed today. Grant Village 
is a major development that includes a campground, visitor center, gas 
station, marina, and 700 units of lodging (planned); plus roads, 
parking lots, sewer and water systems, employee housing, and other 
necessary support facilities. Throughout its history problems have 
arisen, including concessioner financial difficulties, which could have 
terminated the project had the Park Service been less committed to it. 
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Moreover, several policy changes have occurred in the past twenty years 
which reflect changes in NPS philosophy since the time Grant Village was 
begun. The decision making process as used at Grant Village will be 
expanded upon to determine what conclusions can be drawn about 
participants involved in the National Park Service policy process in 
general, and their effects on the results of that process. The focal 
point of this study will be a comparison of national park policy as 
stated at the national level, and policies and management actions at the 
park level. Apparent discrepancies that occur will be examined to 
determine if they actually exist, and if they do, why they occurred. 
Grant Village will be used because it is controversial; several 
participants have been involved in the decisions made over the past 
twenty-five years. It is a major development located in the oldest and 
probably best known national park, and thus it would be expected to 
attract a larger number and broader range of interested participants 
from outside the government than would a smaller development in a lesser 
known park. In addition, more participants from within the government 
would be expected to be involved because of the importance of decisions 
made in the world's first national park. Another reason for using Grant 
Village is that the original concept of the project arose almost fifty 
years ago in a different era of park management, and it has slowly been 
developed over the years with only relatively minor changes. It was 
planned during a period of relatively extreme anthropocentrism in park 
policy, but is being constructed during a time when a more biocentric 
philosophy has been adopted, at least by implication, by the National 
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Park Service; thus, at several points throughout its history decisions 
must have been made that dealt with changes in NPS policy as they 
related to Grant Village. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This study is particularly concerned with the participants in the 
national park policy process and the methods they use to influence the 
process. Ogden (1971) stated that public policy is made within power 
clusters made up of the various participants, or actors, and a 
particular type of policy, such as resource policy (including national 
parks), has its own power cluster. He described those power clusters: 
Public policy in the American political system is made 
within power clusters which operate with remarkable 
independence from one another within the common constitutional 
and political party structure. Each power cluster consists of 
administrative agencies, executive review staff, legislative 
committees, interest groups, influential private citizens, and 
attentive publics who center their public policy concerns and 
activity primarily in one broad policy area. Most power 
clusters operate at all levels of government. 
In order to examine the actors within the national park power 
cluster and to determine the effects of individual actors or groups of 
actors on the national park policy process, a conceptual framework, or 
model, is needed to facilitate understanding of how the process 
functions. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) provide a simple framework for 
the policy process which is well-suited for this analysis. In this 
model, there are three environments in the policy process: policy 
formation, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. Within these 
environments are any number of actors who operate within various arenas 
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to affect policy. Communication linkages occur between different actors 
in the three environments and serve to tie the system together. (Fig. 
Fig. 1. The policy process (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980). 
The advantages of this model are that it is cyclical, fluid 
(actors operating in one environment can also act in others), and open 
(policies can originate within or outside the system). The "classical" 
policy implementation model was hierarchical, with policy formulators 
directing policy to policy implementers who carry out instructions, 
creating policy outputs (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980). Being cyclical 
makes the model more powerful because policy formation and 
implementation are continuing processes. This model also lacks the 
rigidity of the old model; the linkages between environments can go both 
ways between any two environments, rather than one way down through the 
system. 
Further explanation of the principal components of this framework 
is necessary. These explanations are paraphrased from Nakamura and 
1) 
linkages 
ENVIRONMENT I: 
Policy Formation 
(actors and arenas) 
ENVIRONMENT II: 
Policy Implementation 
(actors and arenas) 
linkages 
ENVIRONMENT III: 
Policy Evaluation 
(actors and arenas) 
linkages 
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Smallwood. 
ENVIRONMENT 1^ Policy Formulation. This environment consists 
primarily of formal policy makers—government officials who create 
policy. These actors operate within the governmental arena and are 
influenced by special interest groups and other constituency groups 
from outside arenas who push for policy decisions favorable to their 
respective causes. Clarity, or lack of it, in the policy messages 
passed from the policy makers is a major factor in the implementation 
and evaluation of the policy. 
ENVIRONMENT II: Policy Implementation. Within this environment 
many different actors, operating out of many diverse arenas, work to 
facilitate, hinder, or block the implementation of policy directives 
sent from the formal policy makers. Policy makers from Environment I, 
lobbyists, consumers, the media, among others, as well as formal 
implementers within the government, are involved. Diversity, fluidity, 
and complexity in terms of actors, arenas, and linkages are 
characteristic of this environment; formal implementers must coordinate 
this environment, often using only ambiguous policy directives. As a 
result, the policy implementation environment is very political. 
ENVIRONMENT III: Policy Evaluation. The evaluation of policy 
can be done by the policy makers or the policy implementers, but more 
objective evaluation can best be carried out by professionals who 
evaluate on technical bases. These technical evaluators are limited 
because they have no political constituency of their own; they must 
rely on the power and influence of others. Also, evaluation is not 
totally objective nor an alternative to political judgments because 
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it is "ultimately controlled by policy makers and policy implementers". 
Linkages. The linkages are the communications bridges between 
policy makers and policy implementers, as well as evaluators; they are 
also between those actors within government and actors outside 
government. Linkages between policy makers and implementers are 
especially important. Breakdowns can occur when messages are garbled 
by the senders or misinterpreted (intentionally or unintentionally) by 
receivers, when "overload" occurs (many conflicting messages are 
received), or when "follow-up and compliance mechanisms" fail to ensure 
that messages have been accurately received and carried out. 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study is to examine park policy first in a 
historical context in order to trace the evolution of its philosophical 
orientation, then within the context of a particular case study, in 
order to draw conclusions about differences that occur between stated 
policy at the national level and policies and management actions at the 
park level. 
The overall objectives of this study are: 
1) to provide an understanding of the historical changes in 
national park management philosophy and the actors involved in the 
policy process who were most influential in causing those changes, 
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2) to identify the major actors involved in the Grant Village 
project throughout its history in order to discover who influences 
decisions made at the park level, 
3) to draw conclusions about the philosophy behind broadly 
stated policy at the national level and the effects of various 
actors on policy at the park level, and to theorize about the 
implications these conclusions may have for national park 
management. 
The thesis of this study is that within the set of actors, or 
power cluster, which works to influence park policy a subset of 
actors at the park level effectively works to influence that 
particular park's policy, and frequently prevents those policies 
from following the course of park policy at the national level. 
Therefore, emphasis will be placed on the actors involved in the 
process and the methods they employ to affect the decisions 
resulting from the process, as well as their reasons for 
involvement in the process. A simple, cyclical model will be used 
to facilitate understanding of the the policy process. The actors 
and the arenas within which the actors operate will be identified, 
as will the policy environments (formation, implementation, and 
evaluation) the actors work to affect. 
In order to achieve an overall understanding of how national 
park policy is made, the evolution of national park policy will be 
reviewed, identifying the actors involved, and the relative changes 
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in management philosophy between anthropocentrism and biocentrism 
will be placed within a historical context. The study will then 
focus on a controversial visitor facilities development in 
Yellowstone National Park and the actors involved in the decision 
making process who have helped perpetuate the project in spite of 
various problems and objections. Conclusions will then be drawn as 
to the sets of actors involved at the national level as well as the 
park level and their effects on policies resulting from the 
process. 
CHAPTER TWO: 
A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL PARK POLICY 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the following historical review is to provide a 
basis for understanding the development of national park policy, 
particularly in the areas of concessions and visitor facilities, 
and to show shifts in policy between biocentric and anthropocentric 
management philosophies. Emphasis will be placed on the actors 
involved in the evolution of park policy from the beginning of the 
national park idea in the early nineteenth century to the present. 
THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL PARK IDEA 
The establishment of Yellowstone National Park by Congress in 
1872 is often referred to as the beginning of the national park 
idea, but the origins of the idea actually came from a variety of 
influential people over several years prior to the passage of the 
Yellowstone Act. The most important actors in the early years of 
the national park concept were the writers and artists of the 
nineteenth century who went against the accepted view of wilderness 
as a place to be feared and conquered, and instead depicted the 
American frontier as something beautiful and unique. Their reasons 
for believing in the preservation of wild country were varied, but 
were generally based in biocentric philosophy. 
16 
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George Cat!in was an artist who became famous for his 
paintings of American Indians. In 1832 he foresaw the decline of 
the Indian and buffalo on the Great Plains and wrote: 
And what a splendid contemplation too, when one (who has 
travelled these realms, and can duly appreciate them) imagines 
them as they might in future be seen (by some great protecting 
policy of government) preserved in their pristine beauty and 
wildness...A nation's Park, containing man and beast, in all 
the wild and freshness of their nature's beauty!" (Catlin, 
1880) 
Thus, although Catlin envisioned national parks as huge tracts of 
wilderness set aside so Indians and wildlife could live as they had 
before white man came to the continent, he is generally recognized as 
the first to specifically call for a national park. 
Henry David Thoreau was a writer and leader of the 
Transcendental!st movement, whose members believed that a realm of 
spiritual truths exist on a higher plain than physical truths, and that 
wilderness offered the best environment for seeking these spiritual 
truths (Nash, 1973). They thus advocated the preservation of wilderness 
because wilderness would in turn help preserve civilized man. In 
Thoreau's words, "in Wildness is the preservation of the World" 
(Nash,1973). 
In 1858 Thoreau suggested "national preserves, in which the bear, 
and the panther, and some even of the hunter race may still exist, and 
not be civilized off the face of the earth—not for idle sport or food, 
but for inspiration and our own true recreation" (Udall, 1963). 
Thoreau's vision was thus much like Catlin's, only he cited recreation 
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as a purpose for the preserves. 
Other writers (William Cullen Bryant, James Fenimore Cooper, and 
Ralph Waldo Emerson) and artists (John James Audubon, Thomas Cole, and 
Albert Bierstadt) helped advance the positive image of wilderness 
through their works during the early and mid-1800's. But it was an age 
when the prevalent philosophy was one of "manifest destiny", the belief 
that the possession and settlement of the western frontier by Americans 
was a Christian duty. Also, the "Myth of Superabundance" (Udall, 1963) 
was prevalent; Americans believed the Western frontier to be so vast 
and its resources so abundant that man could never use it all up. Thus, 
wilderness advocates did not reflect the feelings of the majority of 
Americans. Instead, they offered a minority opinion, and while they 
sought wilderness preservation for a variety of reasons and influenced a 
relatively small number of Americans, they did provide the spark for the 
national park idea. 
One of the most important actors in the gradual changing of 
America's environmental philosophy was George Perkins Marsh. In 1864 
Marsh wrote an influential book about man's treatment of nature in which 
he recognized the complexity of ecological interactions, and wrote that 
man's actions can have important, and sometimes devastating, effects on 
the environment; therefore man should recognize and understand the 
potential consequences of his actions before he acts. He put wilderness 
preservation in practical terms; it was useful to protect watersheds 
and regulate stream flows, as well as to provide recreational 
opportunities and wildlife habitat (Nash, 1973). Marsh's reasons for 
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preserving wildlands were anthropocentric, rather than biocentric; his 
argument thus made wilderness protection more compatible with progress 
and economic gain (Nash, 1973), and therefore gained wider acceptance 
for the idea. 
In the same year that Marsh's book was published, 1864, Yosemite 
Valley was ceded by Congress to the state of California. At the time, 
grants to states were not unusual, but the reasons for this particular 
one were important. The valley was to be set aside for "public use, 
resort and recreation", and this use was to be "inalienable for all 
time" (June 30, 1864, c. 184, sees. 1,2,13 Stat. 325). The primary 
actors in getting the valley reserved were a small group of Californians 
concerned about private abuse of the area. They convinced their US 
senator to sponsor protective legislation (Runte, 1979). In that same 
year Albert Bierstadt's paintings of the Rocky Mountains and Yosemite 
Valley had gained him a great deal of fame, and probably helped 
popularize the idea of protection for the Valley. Most likely, however, 
the "driving force" of the Yosemite Valley preservation movement was 
Frederick Law Olmsted (Huth, 1957), who was subsequently appointed the 
first chairman of the board of commissioners established to manage the 
new Yosemite Park (Sax, 1980). Olmsted, a premier landscape architect 
of his day, believed in the preservation of outstanding scenery because, 
in his words, it had a favorable influence on the "health and vigor of 
men" (Nash, 1973). He wrote a report which presented philosophic 
reasons for the establishment of state and national parks; the primary 
reason being that outstanding scenery provides stimulus for man to 
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disengage his thoughts from daily tasks, and to engage them instead in 
contemplation (Sax, 1980). Olmsted believed that activities in parks 
should center around, and be dependent upon, the scenery the park was 
established to preserve; those activities not dependent upon the unique 
scenery, or which interfered with contempletive activities, should not 
be encouraged (Sax, 1980). Olmsted thus believed in preserving 
wildlands for primarily biocentric reasons, and many of his ideas are 
still considered important principles of recreation management today. 
It is important to recognize that in spite of Olmsted's 
biocentrism, Yosemite Valley was not set aside to preserve pristine 
wilderness in response to the writings of wilderness advocates, but 
rather to protect outstanding scenery for the purpose of providing 
public recreation. Many Americans in the nineteenth century felt 
culturally inferior to Europeans because of the lack of cultural 
monuments in America (Runte, 1979). Thus, when writers and artists who 
travelled the West described giant waterfalls and beautiful valleys 
surrounded by majestic mountains, they often compared them to Europe's 
man-made monuments. Runte (1979) uses the term "monumentalism" to 
describe this substitution of natural monuments for man-made monuments 
as cultural symbols, and suggests that it was the underlying reason for 
the establishment of Yosemite Park. Runte's monumentalism is 
fundamentally an anthropocentric concept because it asserts that the 
naturalness of an area was second in importance to its spectacular 
scenery. The style of tourism in that time period supports his theory. 
Fine accommodations and easy access to the points of interest were 
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considered essential to the tourists of that era because they preferred 
to view outstanding scenery from the comfort of their luxury hotel. 
This style of tourism has come to be called the "portal syndrome" 
(Hendee et al., 1978). 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK 
In 1870 an expedition consisting primarily of prominent Montanans 
and an army escort explored the region known today as Yellowstone 
National Park. Fantastic stories of the natural features of the area 
had been circulating since the days of the mountain men. However, after 
the members of the Washburn-Langford-Doane expedition saw the geysers 
and hot springs for themselves, they decided "that there ought to be no 
private ownership of any portion of that region, but that the whole of 
it ought to be set aside as a great National Park" (Langford, 1905). 
Several of the members went on to lobby for the establishment of 
Yellowstone National Park and although they did not originate the 
national park idea, they are often given credit for it because, unlike 
the Yosemite Grant, Yellowstone was kept under federal control (Runte, 
1979). The Yellowstone region was located in a territory rather than in 
a state, and thus had to be retained by the federal government (Udall, 
1963). Eventually, Yosemite Valley was re-ceded to the federal 
government to become part of Yosemite National Park. 
One year after the Washburn-Langford-Doane expedition, the Hayden 
expedition went into the region to survey it and to gain scientific 
information about it. Included in that group were a landscape artist, 
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Thomas Moran, and a photographer, William Henry Jackson (Nash, 1973). 
Upon the expedition's return, a movement to create Yellowstone National 
Park began. The most prominent actors in this movement were members of 
the two expeditions. Hayden and Langford actively lobbied for the Park; 
both wrote articles about the unique features of the region in 
Scribner's Monthly which generated much public interest (Huth, 1957). 
Also, Moran's paintings of the geysers, waterfalls, and Yellowstone 
Lake, as well as Jackson's photographs of the area, were effectively 
used to convince congressmen of its uniqueness (Runte, 1979). 
Therefore, the movement to establish Yellowstone Park was similar to the 
wilderness preservation movement and the Yosemite Valley movement 
because artists and writers were used to influence the public and 
members of Congress. 
However, the most important actor in the creation of Yellowstone 
Park was undoubtedly Jay Cooke's Northern Pacific Railroad, which may 
have actually suggested the park bill (Runte, 1979). In 1871 the 
railroad sponsored lectures given by Langford in the East Cooke financed 
Moran on the Hayden expedition, and an agent of the railroad officially 
asked Hayden to lobby for the park proposal (Runte, 1979). The reason 
for the railroad's interest in the Park was clear: It saw Yellowstone 
as a "national vacation mecca" from which they would profit as the only 
transportation line to the area (Nash, 1973). 
Page 23 
Congress passed the Yellowstone Act in 1872, and just as with the 
Yosemite Grant, the reason for its passage was not wilderness 
protection, but perhaps monumental1sm as Runte (1979) has suggested. 
The "portal" experience of viewing the area from the safety and comfort 
of civilization was again to be provided. When Langford saw Yellowstone 
Lake for the first time in 1870, he clearly did not foresee the area 
preserved in its pristine state: 
It is dotted with islands of great beauty, as yet unvisited by 
man, but which at no remote period will be adorned with villas 
and the ornaments of civilized life...It possesses 
adaptabilities for the highest display of artificial culture, 
amid the greatest wonders of Nature that the world affords, 
and is beautified by the grandeur of the most extensive 
mountain scenery, and not many years can elapse before the 
march of civil improvement will reclaim this delightful 
solitude, and garnish it with all the attractions of 
cultivated taste and refinement. (Langford, 1905) 
While Langford may have refined his prediction for the Lake after his 
initial excitement, he definitely favored some form of public use, as 
his diary states: "I do not know of any portion of our country where a 
national park can be established furnishing to visitors more wonderful 
attractions than here" (Langford, 1905). Langford's comments reflect 
the general anthropocentrism that pervaded in his day. Undoubtedly he 
also reflected the Northern Pacific railroad's attitude as well. 
Also, passage of the bill was not due to a strong feeling of 
support in Congress, but rather to the lack of opposition. Some members 
had reservations about the bill, but it passed for four primary reasons: 
First, although the amount of land to be set aside was huge, its size 
had nothing to do with protecting complete ecosystems or preserving 
wilderness; it was intended to be that extensive only to protect as yet 
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undiscovered geysers, hot pools, and other outstanding natural features 
(Runte, 1979). Second, as in the case of almost every succeeding 
national park establishment bill, the Yellowstone region was presented 
by park supporters as economically worthless (Runte, 1979). This 
argument was necessary to appease actors from mining, ranching, and 
lumber interests so they would not use their considerable influence in 
Congress to block the bill. Third, the area was largely inaccessible, 
and the Myth of Superabundance probably prevented some members of 
Congress from being concerned about such a remote and economically 
insignificant area. However, Congress did reserve the right to dissolve 
the Park should economic interests demand it. Runte (1979) quoted 
Representative Dawes, who stated at the time of the debate over the 
bill: 
This bill reserves control over [Yellowstone] and preserves 
the control over it to the United States, so that at any time 
when it shall appear that it will be better to devote it to 
any other purpose it will be perfectly within the control of 
the United States to do it. 
Fourth, supporters believed the Park would be self-supporting, which 
eliminated opposition from members of Congress concerned about the cost 
of the Park to taxpayers. This belief is further evidence of the 
anthropocentrism behind the park's establishment, because only by 
providing the luxury accommodations demanded by the "portal" tourists 
could the Park be expected to generate adequate income. 
In the Yellowstone Act, just as in the Yosemite Grant, Congress did 
not state its intentions regarding management policies for the Park, or 
the type of recreational opportunities to be provided for visitors (Sax, 
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1976). The Act stated that the area was to be "set apart as a public 
park or pleasuring-ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people", 
and that the Secretary of the Interior "shall provide for the 
preservation, from injury or spoliation of all timber, mineral deposits, 
natural curiosities, or wonders within said park, and their retention in 
their natural condition", and "provide against the wanton destruction of 
the fish and game found within said park". Exactly how the Park was to 
be used for the "benefit and enjoyment of the people" was not specified, 
and the bill provided no funding, staff, or penalties for violating 
protective provisions of the law. However, the bill did include a 
provision for the Secretary to grant leases for "small parcels of 
ground, at such places in said park as shall require the erection of 
buildings for the accommodation of visitors". Congress thus recognized 
the anthropocentric support for the Act and considered concessions 
within the Park appropriate. Lobbying by the Northern Pacific Railroad 
was probably at least partially responsible for this provision being in 
the bill; railroad officials recognized the necessity of having 
comfortable accommodations in the park to draw tourists. 
For the first ten years of the Park's existence, however, the area 
was very remote and largely inaccessible; visitation was confined 
primarily to wealthy Easterners and settlers from surroundings areas. 
Langford was appointed the first superintendent, and immediately 
implemented a policy of denying virtually all applications from private 
interests desiring to construct and operate toll roads, hotels, and 
stores in the Park (Bartlett, 1983). Most likely he was waiting for the 
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Northern Pacific to lay tracks to the area and place their own 
concessions application (Haines, 1977). Some small concessioners 
claiming to have been in the area prior to 1872 were allowed to continue 
operating their crude concessions (Bartlett, 1983). These operations 
consisted primarily of a log shack "hotel" and small bathhouses at 
Mammoth Hot Springs (Haines, 1977). 
Not until 1877 did the Secretary of the Interior establish rules 
prohibiting commercial hunting, fishing, and trapping, and not until a 
year later did Congress provide any management funds for the Park (Ise, 
1961). The second Yellowstone superintendent, Philetus Norris, used 
some of those funds to construct the first crude road system, which was 
designed to take visitors to the prominent features of the park: 
Mammoth Hot Springs, the Upper Geyser Basin, the Grand Canyon of the 
Yellowstone River, and the outlet of the River at Yellowstone Lake 
(Haines, 1977). The road system that exits in the Park today 
essentially follows Norris' original layout, and it is important to 
recognize that it was designed to provide tourist access to the natural 
features preserved within the Park, in keeping with the anthropocentric 
desires of the "portal" tourist. 
By 1882 Norris' road system was fairly extensive; the Northern 
Pacific had extended its tracks to Livingston, Montana, sixty miles 
north of the Park, and had begun to publicize the Park as a vacation 
"Wonderland" in order to entice travellers to ride their line (Bartlett, 
1983). Norris favored the licensing of guides and the development of 
concessions and, unlike his predecessor, he opposed the railroad's 
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efforts to gain monopolistic control of Park concessions. This 
opposition indirectly led to his removal from the superintendency when a 
group of Montanans whose town would have benefited from a Northern 
Pacific line into the Park objected to Norris' policies and gained the 
support of railroad allies in Congress (Haines, 1977). The railroad was 
thus once again was an important actor in the formation of national park 
policy. However, Congress as a whole favored competition in the Park; 
one senator went so far as to state, "All who desire to operate 
concessions of any kind in Yellowstone National Park should be permitted 
to do so" (Everhart, 1972). Nevertheless, the railroad had powerful 
allies and Norris' replacement was a man much more sympathetic to its 
interests (Haines, 1977). Also, the Secretary of the Interior 
anticipated substantial numbers of tourists since the area had become 
accessible, and realized that they would be expecting resort hotels to 
accommodate them (Bartlett, 1983). He believed a monopolized 
concessioner would be best able to build those facilities quickly, and 
granted the concessions contract to a group of investors with Northern 
Pacific connections. In 1882 a monopoly entered the Park, and from 1892 
until 1967 the primary hotel and transportation concessions were 
operated by the same company managed by two men and their descendents 
(Bartlett, 1983). However, Bartlett states that this arrangement came 
about because of pressure and politics, not planning or past policy. It 
is clear that from the initial movement to establish Yellowstone 
National Park through the early stages of policy formation, the railroad 
interests were the leading actors in the process. They were able to 
exert substantial pressure because of the expansionist desires of a 
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public who wanted more access to the West, and because the vague intent 
of the Yellowstone Act allowed a wide range of interpretations. 
Furthermore, the anthropocentric orientation of the park movement and 
early park policy was due to a significant extent to the railroad's 
influence and its desire to serve the "portal" tourist. 
The Park did not have an adequate staff to enforce the protective 
rules established by the Secretary. Squatters, poachers, and vandals 
became so numerous, the wildlife so decimated, and the mineral 
formations around the thermal features so scarred, that in 1886 the 
Department of the Interior requested the Secretary of War to send a 
troop of cavalry to take over the administration and protection of the 
Park (Hampton, 1971). The request came about partly as a result of 
criticism of Park administration by a member of Congress and the editor 
of the Chicago Tribune, who were heavily fined by corrupt officials of 
the Park while on a visit there; at the time Congress had grown 
discontented with the Park's management and had considered repeal of the 
Yellowstone Act, turning the Park over to Wyoming territory, or ending 
civilian administration of the Park (Haines, 1977). Had either of the 
first two options been chosen the national park movement would most 
likely have come to an early end. Once again, the primary actors in 
policy formation (in this case military administration) were prominent 
people who enjoyed influence in Congress. 
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The army took over the administration of the Park in 1886, and in 
spite of there being no "well-defined policy of protection", no 
"judicial machinery" for the prosecution of violators, and no training 
for the soldiers in how to protect the Park, it managed Yellowstone and 
other national parks as they were established and is credited with 
saving the early national system (Hampton, 1971). 
Not until 1894, with the passage of the Lacey Act (16 U.S.C.S. 
24,26,30,30a), did the Army receive the judicial machinery to prosecute 
and punish law breakers; prior to passage of the Act soldiers used 
extralegal means of punishment, such as temporary and unauthorized 
incarceration (Hampton, 1971). The Act established penalties for 
killing or injuring wildlife, removing timber, and damaging thermal 
features; it also set up a legal system for the prosecution of 
violators under the sole jurisdiction of the federal government. 
According to Hampton (1971), several similar bills failed to pass 
because railroad proponents in Congress always added amendments which 
granted rights-of-way through the Park to the Northern Pacific. Park 
proponents would then remove their support from the bill. The Lacey Act 
passed because George Bird Grinnell, editor of Field and Stream, wrote 
several editorials about poaching and vandalism in the Park, and also 
because citizens of Wyoming, Idaho, and Utah signed petitions protesting 
a railroad right-of-way. Although visitation was still quite low, a 
little over 5300 in 1895 (Hampton, 1971), the public knew of the Park 
largely through stories in books and magazines, and through railroad 
advertisements. Thus, public involvement was becoming a major factor in 
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the Park policy process. The railroad lobby was still very powerful, 
and determined to gain as much control of Yellowstone as it could get. 
Also, in 1890 Yosemite, Sequoia, and General Grant (now part of 
Sequoia-Kings Canyon) were set aside, largely through the efforts of the 
Southern Pacific Railroad; in later years other railroads helped get 
Glacier (Great Northern Railway), Grand Canyon (Santa Fe Railroad), and 
other parks established (Runte, 1974). The railroads were obviously a 
very formidable lobby. One park proponent in the Senate described the 
railroad lobby as "exactly like a compact military organization working 
for one object alone. They are persistent, aggressive, sleepless, 
untiring, and they are determined..." (Hampton, 1971). The national 
park movement and the railroads thus entered into a "pragmatic 
alliance"; railroad lobbying helped create parks, their advertisements 
helped increase visitation and boost public support of the parks but 
their motives were purely selfish and therefore park proponents were 
wary of them (Runte, 1974). 
POLICY FORMATION DURING MILITARY ADMINISTRATION 
During civilian administration, the superintendent of Yellowstone 
was responsible for most of the policy formation. Congress had no clear 
idea of what was to be done with the Park they had created, and in the 
early years after it was established, showed little interest in Park 
matters because the public had not yet become interested; therefore the 
superintendent had a free hand in making and implementing policy (within 
budgetary constraints), until his actions came in conflict with an 
influential actor in the process, most often the railroad. Norris 
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designed and constructed roads as he wanted them (Haines, 1977); 
established policies forbidding the cutting of timber and removal of 
mineral deposits, prohibiting hunting, trapping, and fishing (except to 
provide food for visitors or residents), and forbidding the selling of 
liquor or establishing a permanent residence within the Park (Hampton, 
1971). He also worked to prevent the railroad from gaining control of 
Park concessions (Haines, 1977). It was his railroad policy that led to 
his removal. His successor was removed at least partly because he stood 
in the way of a monopoly attempt by a railroad-backed concessioner 
(Haines, 1977). Thus, policy evaluation in the early period of 
Yellowstone Park history was indirectly carried out in a large measure 
by the Northern Pacific Railroad. 
When the Army took over administration of Yellowstone and the other 
parks as they were established, the effect was to: 
..remove the administration of the Park from the political 
arena; and under the direction of energetic and conscientious 
military officers the rules and regulations governing the Park 
were revised and enforced, various threats to the very 
existence of the Park were met and overcome, policy was 
determined, a precedent was established for a national park 
system, and punitive legislation was finally obtained from a 
reluctant Congress. (Hampton, 1971) 
Under the Army superintendents several policies were initiated or 
continued from civilian superintendents: cutting timber, hunting, 
trapping, discharging firearms, selling liquor, grazing stock, and 
throwing objects into geysers and hot springs was prohibited; use of 
campfires was restricted (Hampton, 1971). Also, the practices of fish 
stocking in barren lakes, predator control, active forest fire 
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suppression, and the building of backcountry patrol cabins were begun 
(Hampton, 1971). Therefore, while army administration effectively 
blunted the railroad's influence, several anthropocentric policies were 
instituted which were meant to change the parks to suit the desires of 
the visiting public. 
During the 32 years of Army administration a national park "system" 
was begun, but it was actually a very loose collection of independently 
managed units. According to Ise (1961), "each park was officially a 
separate unit, administratively different from the others". In the 
first decade of the twentieth century a controversy arose which gave 
evidence of the weakness of the park "system". The city of San 
Francisco needed a source of water, and decided that Hetch Hetchy Valley 
in Yosemite Park would be an excellent location for a dam to produce 
hydroelectric power and to provide a reservoir for drinking water (Nash, 
1973). Hetch Hetchy was "an aesthetic and geographical complement to 
the Yosemite Valley" (Mantell, 1979), and park proponents vigorously 
objected to the proposal. 
The conservation of natural resources had become an accepted 
concept by the turn of the twentieth century. The issue was no longer 
"between a good (civilization) and an evil (wilderness) but between two 
goods" (Nash, 1973). Conservation as described by Marsh in 1864 had 
grown into a viable movement in American society, largely due to the 
efforts of President Theodore Roosevelt, an ardent, lifelong 
conservationist (Udall, 1963); but the Hetch Hetchy controversy served 
to widen a split within the movement between the utilitarians and the 
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preservationists. Utilitarians believed in the use of all resources for 
commercial needs: timber, minerals, livestock. The use they advocated 
was not the destructive and wasteful use practiced in the previous 
century, but the "wise use" (Nash, 1973) Marsh had advocated, which 
could be sustained over several generations with minimal damage to the 
resource. Their concept of conservation was at the far anthropocentric 
end of the management philosophy scale, and they believed that damming 
the Valley was a proper use, and the most beneficial use. 
Preservationists on the other hand believed, like Thoreau, that 
civilized man could benefit from the preservation of outstanding scenery 
and pristine wilderness. Their philosophy was strongly biocentric, and 
they felt that the dam would needlessly destroy a wild area equal in 
scenic beauty to Yosemite Valley. 
The two most prominent actors in this controversy were Gifford 
Pinchot and John Muir. Pinchot, Chief Forester of the USDA Forest 
Service, was a "highly effective publicizer" for the utilitarian opinion 
(Nash, 1973). He was a "magnificent bureaucrat" who worked closely with 
Theodore Roosevelt to form a conservation policy that forced "the 
American people to turn from flagrant waste of resources to programs of 
wise stewardship" (Udall, 1963). Pinchot believed that "conservation 
meant use rather than reservation from use" (Ise, 1961), and thus had no 
interest in parks or wilderness preservation. He felt that a dam in 
Hetch Hetchy Valley was a proper use of the resource which would benefit 
the greatest number of people. Pinchot used his considerable influence 
to work from within the federal government for the dam's construction. 
Page 34 
Muir, on the other hand, was a naturalist and founder of the Sierra Club 
who believed in the Transcendentalist interpretation of wilderness 
(Nash, 1973). He felt that "wilderness freedom, like political freedom, 
was perennially in danger and could be maintained only by eternal 
vigilance" (Udall, 1963). Like Pinchot, Muir was a friend of Roosevelt 
and an effective publicizer; but Muir worked from outside the 
government to convince Roosevelt and the American public that Hetch 
Hetchy should be preserved. He was known for his fiery oratory, and his 
arguments against the dam took on religious overtones. He called dam 
supporters "temple destroyers", and went further in stating: "Dam Hetch 
Hetchy! As well dam for water-tanks the people's cathedrals and 
churches; for no holier temple has ever been consecrated by the heart 
of man" (Ise, 1961). Muir's speeches, as well as magazine articles and 
editorials of the day, helped make the Hetch Hetchy dam proposal a 
national controversy. 
In 1913, after a long and bitter political battle, Congress voted 
to allow the construction of the dam. The controversy had several 
important implications for the national park preservation movement. 
First, because of the intense public support the battle had generated 
for the parks, the movement had been shown to be a "viable political 
force", but it was also "apparent that the very survival of the national 
parks depended on the number of people who visited them" (Mantel 1, 
1979). Also, rather than using the argument that parks were 
economically worthless, preservationists realized that they needed to 
stress the potential economic advantages of tourism to the parks, which 
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meant they had to compromise some of their blocentrlsm. Third, the 
controversy served to introduce the biocentric approach into national 
park management, at least as a concept to be considered. 
CREATION OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 
The Hetch Hetchy battle also served to point out the need for 
unified management of the park "system". By 1915, the "system" 
consisted of fourteen independently managed units (Sax, 1976), including 
Yellowstone, Yosemite, Rainier, Crater Lake, and Glacier; each created 
by separate acts of Congress, and all in the Interior Department. It 
also included several national monuments, most established from the 
public domain by presidential proclamation under broad interpretation of 
the Antiquities Act of 1906 (16 U.S.C. 431 et seq.); these monuments 
included Muir Woods, Mount Olympus, and the Grand Canyon. Some of these 
were under the control of the Department of Agriculture, others were 
under the War Department (Ise, 1961). Shankland (1951) described the 
situation: 
The concessioners operated under widely variant 
regulations from park to park. The division of authority 
among the parks, and even inside a single park, came close to 
chaos. In Yellowstone all improvements and their 
appropriations were managed by an officer of the Army Corps of 
Engineers, who answered to neither the Interior Department nor 
the park superintendent; the Superintendent was himself an 
army officer, appointed by the Secretary of War; and 
"exclusive control" rested with the Secretary of the Interior. 
Other serious problems plagued the parks. Buchholtz (1969) 
described two of the most serious: 
Page 36 
Congress formulated each of the national park organic 
acts with a similarity of vague goals and imprecise wording 
which, in time, contributed to administrative confusion during 
their application or enforcement. 
Most parks did not receive any appropriations from Congress 
until several years after their formation, because of the 
belief that they were to be self-supporting. 
Ise (1961) described another, perhaps less evident, problem: 
Some locality with an area of very modest scenic values, or 
perhaps nothing at all, with an eye to Congressional 
appropriations and profitable tourist traffic, might steam up 
a campaign to have it made a national park, and if it had an 
influential delegation in Congress might succeed in it. 
In 1915, Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane, in an effort to 
solve these problems brought Stephen Mather to Washington, D.C. to be 
Assistant to the Secretary in charge of the parks. Mather was given the 
responsibility of gaining Congressional support of the parks in order to 
get increases in appropriations for the system, additions of appropriate 
units to the system, and authorization of a bureau to manage the system; 
he was also directed to organize this bureau once it was created, 
develop facilities both within and around the parks, and increase public 
use and support of the parks (Shankland, 1951). 
Several influential people had been pushing in Washington for an 
agency to manage the whole park system for several years before Mather 
arrived there (Ise, 1961). However, along with the Hetch Hetchy 
resolution, Mather's arrival in the capital was a major factor in 
getting a managing agency created. Mather was a "[s]elf-made 
millionaire, philanthropist, mountain climber" (Udall, 1963); he "was a 
man of prodigious and explosive energy, a tireless worker, a born 
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promoter" (Ise, 1961), "a disciple of John Muir" (Sax, 1976), and a 
member of Muir's Sierra Club. He used his "business acumen and powers 
of persuasion" (Udall, 1963) to publicize the parks in order to gain the 
necessary support for the creation of an agency to manage them. 
In 1916 the National Park Service Act was passed by Congress. 
Mather worked closely with Horace Albright, a young lawyer in the 
Interior Department, to organize the new Service as ordered by the Act 
(Runte, 1979). Utilitarians in general, and the Forest Service in 
particular, had opposed the bill; the Forest Service felt it could best 
manage all federal lands, but preservationists saw the bill as "a 
clear-cut blueprint of what the national parks stood for and how they 
should be administered" (Runte, 1979). Control of all existing and 
future national parks, plus the national monuments in the Department of 
the Interior was granted to the new agency in the Act; the monuments in 
the Departments of War and Agriculture remained there until 1933 (Lee, 
1974). By 1918 the army was removed completely from the parks (Hampton, 
1971), and Park Service rangers took over the soldiers' duties. 
Rather than being a "clear-cut blueprint" for the parks, the Act 
went no further than previous legislation in defining their proper use. 
Instead it contained a mandate for the Service that has been at the 
center of virtually every policy dispute since the Act was passed. The 
Service was directed to "promote and regulate use" of the parks, while 
at the same time it was also directed to "to conserve the scenery and 
the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to 
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means 
Page 38 
as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations". 
This "double mandate of preservation and use", as these statements have 
come to be known, leaves the Service a great deal of discretion as to 
what uses are to be considered appropriate in the national parks. 
STEPHEN MATHER'S NATIONAL PARK POLICY 
Mather was appointed the first director of the Service, and he 
served in that position from 1917 until 1929, although his health broke 
several times in that period from overwork. He died in 1930, after 
being stricken in 1928 (Ise, 1961). Albright became Mather's close 
friend, and served as his assistant and as superintendent of Yellowstone 
from 1919 to 1929 (Haines, 1977), when he succeeded Mather as Director. 
He served in that position until 1933 when he retired to enter private 
business (Ise, 1961). 
Together Mather and Albright worked to create a unified policy for 
the national park system. Mather was undoubtedly the single most 
important actor in the early formation of National Park Service policy. 
Like Muir before him, he saw the need to cultivate support for the 
parks, and devoted his energy and promotional skills toward convincing 
"the leading eastern newspapers and magazines that the parks should be 
sacrosanct. He carefully cultivated the members of Congress from the 
park states, as well as those from other areas with committee 
assignments important to the service" (Smith, 1966). He made every 
effort to place the parks in the public consciousness. According to Ise 
(1961), "[h]e courted senators and representatives and government 
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dignitaries, writers...and newspaper owners and reporters". One of his 
most effective ways of cultivating support was to take such influential 
people on excursions through some of the parks (Ise, 1961). Mather 
understood the importance of writers, as well as painters of national 
park scenes (Ise, 1961), in influencing public attitudes of the parks; 
he thus continued the practice that had been an important part of the 
growth of public acceptance of the national park idea throughout its 
history. 
Mather also actively cultivated the support of the railroads, who 
as had historically been true, were very willing to promote the parks. 
Unable to foresee the coming impact of the automobile, they extensively 
promoted park tourism (Ise, 1961), fully expecting to be the sole 
beneficiaries of increased travel to the parks. Therefore, although 
they did not enjoy the power they previously had, they remained 
important actors in the park policy process. 
Concessions were a major problem when Mather joined the Interior 
Department in 1915. He felt the concessions system in general needed to 
be "overhauled" (Ise, 1961). Yellowstone, for example, had the most 
extensive concessions system of all the parks, but there was much 
competition and overlapping of services. The primary hotel and 
transportation systems established in 1892 had expanded to include a 
chain of five hotels, two lunch stations, and a stagecoach line under 
the auspices of two companies, both run by the same man; there were 
also two other stagecoach lines, three permanent-camp systems, and a 
"grab-bag of traveling camps" (Shankland, 1951). Mather saw this 
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situation as wasteful and costly to visitors. He believed a regulated 
monopoly would be more efficient and better able to provide quality 
service at more reasonable prices. It took until 1924, but through 
mergers, buy-outs, and coercion Mather succeeded in creating a monopoly 
out of the concessions, excluding general stores and minor concessions 
(Ise, 1961). Also, in 1915 he induced two of the stagecoach companies 
to merge in order to establish a motor-bus service, which brought the 
automobile to the Park (Shankland, 1951). 
Some of Mather's promotional ideas would be considered quite 
inappropriate in national parks today. He once wrote in reference to 
Yellowstone: 
Golf links, tennis courts, swimming pools, and other equipment 
for outdoor pastime and exercise should be provided by 
concessions, and the park should be extensively advertised as 
a place to spend the summer instead of five or six days of 
hurried sight-seeing under constant pressure to keep moving 
... There is no national park better suited by nature for 
spending leisurely vacations (Ise, 1961). 
However, Merriam (1972) stated that "in spite of the drumfire of 
visit-your-parks propaganda that emanated from the new bureau, the 
earliest formal statement of the new National Park Service showed that 
Lane, Mather, and company had a very clear and less selfishly motivated 
idea of the nature and mission of a national park." He quoted the first 
annual report of the Service, in 1916, as stating that the national 
parks were not supposed to be thought of primarily in terms of 
recreation. The report stated, "the fostering of recreation purely as 
such is more properly the function of the city, county, and state parks, 
and there should be a clear distinction between the character of such 
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parks and national parks." Mather thus advocated a biocentric approach 
to national park policy, but he recognized the fact that certain aspects 
of anthropocentrism were a necessary part of any policy that was to have 
wide public support. At that time in national park history, when the 
national parks were still relatively unknown, generating substantial 
public support was essential; therefore Mather's policies were not as 
strongly biocentric as many preservationists would have liked. 
The most important piece of policy that came out of the Mather era 
was a letter from Secretary Lane to Mather, written in 1918. In it, the 
administrative policies of the Park Service were spelled out. The 
letter provided the basis for Park Service management that remains 
fundamentally intact today. Ise (1961) quoted the three primary goals 
from the letter: 
First, that the national parks must be maintained in 
absolutely unimpaired form for the use of future generations 
as well as those of our own time; second, that they are set 
aside for the use, observation, health, and pleasure of the 
people; and third, that the national interest must dictate 
all decisions affecting public or private enterprise in the 
parks. 
Significantly, preservation of the parks was the first priority listed. 
According to Ise (1961), other policies set forth in the letter were: 
Cattle grazing was allowed in areas not frequented by visitors in all 
parks but Yellowstone; no leases were to be granted for summer homes; 
no timber cutting was permitted, except for buildings, and only where it 
would not affect the forest or landscape; roads were to harmonize with 
the landscape; private inholdings were to be eliminated; all outdoor 
sports, including winter sports, were to be encouraged; educational 
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use, as well as recreational use of the parks, was a desired goal; 
low-priced camps, as well as high-priced hotels, were to be offered to 
visitors; concessioners were to be protected against competition, and 
were to pay a revenue to the government, but not so that it would place 
a burden on the visitor; the Service was to cooperate with city, 
county, and state parks; the Service was to use the Railroad 
Administration, chambers of commerce, tourist bureaus, and "auto-highway 
associations" to advertise the parks; only areas of distinctive scenery 
or unique features were to be considered for inclusion into the system. 
The letter was widely believed to have been completely, or at least 
partly, written by Mather and then signed by Lane. But in 1964 Albright 
admitted writing the letter while Mather was recuperating from a nervous 
breakdown (Garrison, 1980). The letter undoubtedly, expressed the 
beliefs of both Mather and Albright, with Lane's approval, and reflected 
Mather's primarily biocentric beliefs mixed with anthropocentric 
provisions. 
The letter has been called the "magna carta" of the national parks 
(Mantell, 1979) because in it basic principles were set forth which more 
clearly stated what the national parks were to be. It reflected a 
biocentric orientation by stressing unimpaired preservation for the use 
of future generations, but it also reflected some anthropocentrism by 
advocating educational use of the parks, a range of facilities to serve 
all income levels, and extensive advertisement of the parks. The letter 
also set forth monopolized concessions as a desirable goal. While 
Mather had always favored monopolies in the parks, the Lane Letter was 
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the first official statement of them as National Park policy. 
The Lane Letter was important for another reason: It came from 
within the Service. The intent of Congress regarding specific park 
policy was still unknown or nonexistent, and therefore it was left up to 
Mather and Albright to create policy. Thus, Congress was willing to 
leave the formation of park policy up to the Park Service. The 
discretion left to the Service in 1918 is significant today because it 
set a precedent for the role of Congress in national park management. 
In 1925, another Secretary of the Interior, Hubert Work, restated 
the national park mandate with even more emphasis on the preservation 
aspect: "The duty imposed upon the National Park Service in the organic 
act creating it to faithfully preserve the parks and monuments for 
posterity in essentially their natural state is paramount to every other 
activity" (Merriam, 1972). 
When Albright succeeded Mather as director, Park Service policy 
continued in the same direction Mather had started it, plus its duties 
expanded to include management of new parks, historical sites, and 
monuments; it also gained control over many units previously under the 
Departments of War and Agriculture (Ise, 1961). 
THE SERVICE AFTER MATHER AND ALBRIGHT 
The outward expansion of the Service's responsibilities continued 
when Arno Cammerer replaced Albright as director. Cammerer had served 
under both Mather and Albright, and took over the Service in the midst 
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of the Great Depression. During his administration, Congress 
continually cut the parks' funding although visitation rose rapidly, 
from almost 3.5 million in 1933 to almost 16.8 million in 1940 (Ise, 
1961). 
At the Service's urging Congress passed the Historic Sites and 
Building Act of 1935 (16 U.S.C.S. 461 et seq.), which "declared it a 
national policy to preserve such things for the inspiration and benefit 
of the people" (Ise, 1961). The system also expanded to include 
National Recreation Areas, National Parkways, National Seashores, 
National Military Parks, National Capital Parks, and National 
Cemeteries. 
Also, during Cammerer's tenure as director conservation groups 
became more organized and vocal about park policy, and he was criticized 
by "purists" in the conservation movement for overbroadening the 
Service's responsibilities, de-emphasizing and over-developing the 
scenic parks and monuments, and making too many concessions to 
commercial interests in newly established parks (Ise, 1961). This 
criticism of the Service from within the national park movement marked 
the beginning of a split between those who wanted only the most scenic 
and pristine natural areas included in the system, and those who wanted 
any area of nationally significant historic, cultural, or recreational 
value, as well as outstanding scenery included in the system. This 
difference of opinion has grown and polarized in the years since its 
beginning as the Service's responsibilities have widened and the system 
has grown. 
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The controversy during Cammerer's directorship also marked the 
beginning of active participation in the Park Service policy process by 
organized conservation groups. Two of the most vocal critics were the 
Wilderness Society and the National Parks Association (now the National 
Parks and Conservation Association). Stephen Mather helped found the 
N.P.A. in 1919 to, in the words of its organizers, "defend the National 
Parks and Monuments fearlessly against assaults of private interests and 
aggressive commercialism" (Ise, 1961). The N.P.A. had previously had 
disagreements with Mather's policy, but the broadening of the system 
under Cammerer was essentially the beginning of a continuing 
disagreement over park policy. Ise (1961) described the dispute: 
Some of the purists simply wanted one kind of park 
administration, the Park Service believed in a somewhat 
different sort of administration; and they were both 
informed, enlightened, and sincere. To some extent the 
difference was due to their different respective positions; 
the purists were free of all responsibilities and could speak 
and write without fear or inhibitions; the Park Service, on 
the other hand, had a job to do, the job not only of 
protecting the parks but of making them accessible—as 
required, by implication at least, by the act of 1916—and of 
winning friends and public support for them. 
In other words, the "purists" were free to speak their mind without 
restriction. The Park Service, on the other hand, had political 
constraints. The diversification of the system, as well as the rise in 
visitation that accompanied it, broadened the Service's constituency and 
greatly increased the number of actors involved in the policy process; 
many of these actors were much less "purist" oriented than others. The 
purists basically feared that diversifying the system would cloud the 
origins of the system, and that the addition of areas established 
primarily to provide recreation would shift NPS policy away from the 
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biocentrism they advocated. 
Cammerer left the director's office in 1940, and was replaced by 
Newton Drury. Drury was not a career Park Service man, but had 
previously had contacts with Mather while serving as executive secretary 
of the Save-the-Redwoods-League (Shankland, 1951). World War II was 
fought during the first half of Drury's administration and most of his 
efforts were directed toward preventing commercial interests from 
exploiting the parks for timber, range, minerals, and water under the 
guise of aiding the war effort (Ise, 1961). He was quite successful, 
probably because the War ended before these interests could gain enough 
support for their proposals. Drury was successful in preventing timber 
and mineral extraction from Olympic Park, and in preventing dams from 
being built in Glacier and the Grand Canyon (Ise, 1961). 
Gas-rationing during the War was partly responsible for reducing 
visitation to the parks; as a result most hotels in the parks were 
closed or their seasons shortened. In Yellowstone, for instance, Lake 
Hotel and all the lodges remained closed until the War ended (Haines, 
1977). Congressional appropriations, as well as ranger and maintenance 
forces, were largely lost to the war effort. As a result park 
facilities fell into disrepair. 
The War effectively ended the period of growth and expansion of the 
national park system begun by Mather. During that period the number and 
types of units in the system increased, policy was formed, and most 
importantly, public use and support of the parks had increased 
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dramatically. The national parks had gone from being rather obscure 
pieces of federal land to being a popular part of American culture. 
THE PARKS AFTER WORLD WAR II 
In the years following World War II, the parks were inundated with 
visitors. The automobile had become not only affordable to the average 
American, but also a reliable means of transportation, and after the 
combined hardships of the Depression and the War Americans began to 
travel as never before possible. Tourism became a major national 
industry; visitation to the parks jumped from 6.9 million in 1943 to 
21.7 million in 1946, and to 29.6 million in 1948 (Drury, 1949). Park 
concessioners had great difficulties providing the necessary services; 
the hotels had deteriorated due to lack of maintenance, and as Ise 
(1961) stated; 
After five hungry years they had insufficient supplies, labor, 
buses, and many other things; especially they lacked 
experienced help and accommodations for their help, and had to 
pay much higher wages for such inexperienced help as they 
could get. 
Drury was thus faced with circumstances opposite from those Mather 
faced; the parks had become so popular that funding and staffing could 
not keep up with the increases in visitation. Drury, like his 
predecessors in the national park movement, used the media in an effort 
to point out the problems in the parks. In 1949 he wrote an article in 
American Forests in which he made a case for increased funding from 
Congress; however, the necessary appropriations did not come during his 
administration, and he was unable to solve the problems he faced. 
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During his tenure Drury suggested two long range solutions to 
overcrowding which became important years after he first conceived them. 
In 1945, he considered moving concession facilities and administration 
buildings out of congested areas of some parks; he also considered 
earlier opening and later closing dates in some parks to spread 
visitation out over a longer season, and proposed government 
construction of concessioner facilities (Ise, 1961). His proposals to 
manipulate visitors and facilities rather than the environment are 
evidence of his strong biocentric orientation. 
In fact, Drury was arguably the most "purist" oriented and 
biocentric of the directors to that time, and his opposition to 
commercial exploitation of the parks cost him the directorship in 1951. 
He was forced to resign by the Secretary of the Interior because he 
refused to support the Secretary's approval of construction of a system 
of dams in Dinosaur National Monument (Ise, 1961). The situation was 
one of park policy being formed above the agency, at higher levels of 
the federal government, with the Secretary being the most visible actor. 
Drury failed to implement the policy as dictated to him and was removed 
from his position. Congress served to evaluate the policy by 
overturning the Secretary's approval of the dams, after extensive 
lobbying by several conservation organizations. Once again Congress did 
not create policy, but acted as policy evaluators. 
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Drury's biocentric argument for park preservation was quoted by Ise 
(1961): 
If we are going to succeed in preserving the greatness of 
the national parks, they must be held inviolate. They 
represent the last stand of primitive America. If we are 
going to whittle away at them we should recognize, at the very 
beginning, that all such whittlings are cumulative and that 
the end result will be mediocrity. Greatness will be gone. 
CONRAD WIRTH AND MISSION 66 \ 
In 1951 Conrad Wirth ascended to the directorship from within the 
Service. His background was as a landscape architect; his first 
association with the NPS came during the Great Depression when, as an 
administrator with the Civilian Conservation Corps, he oversaw 
construction projects in the parks (Wirth, 1980). His development 
background signaled a significant shift in emphasis from Drury's 
biocentrism toward a more anthropocentric philosophy. 
During the early years of Wirth's directorship the parks continued 
to deteriorate while visitation rapidly rose. In 1940 the national park 
system included 161 areas encompassing 21.5 million acres, with 
approximately 17 million visitors and appropriations of almost 33.5 
million dollars; by 1955 the system had expanded to include 181 units 
encompassing almost 24 million acres, with approximately 55.6 million 
visitors, operating with appropriations of only 32.5 million dollars 
(Wirth, 1980). In other words, during those 15 years the national park 
system increased by 20 units, visitation tripled, but appropriations 
from Congress decreased by a million dollars. One editorial placed the 
blame for the park "crisis" on Congress for not appropriating sufficient 
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funds, and on the concessioners for "enjoying monopolies,...taking 
advantage of the situation" by providing poor service at high prices 
(Netboy, 1955). 
In February of 1955 Wirth devised a ten year plan to upgrade and 
expand park facilities to meet the increasing visitor pressure. He felt 
that a long term program, including proposals for developments in almost 
every unit of the system rather than short term requests for the funding 
of individual projects, would have a better chance of receiving broad 
support in Congress because units in practically every state would 
benefit (Wirth, 1980). He called the program Mission 66 (frequently 
referred to as M66), and it was intended to culminate in 1966, the 
fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the National Park Service. The 
program was intended to get sufficient funding from Congress to improve 
and expand facilities in the park system in order to accommodate 80 
million visitors per year, the number estimated to be visiting the 
system by 1966. 
Wirth set up a "Mission 66 Committee" consisting of personnel in 
the Washington office of the Park Service. Members were from the 
divisions of Design and Construction, Operations, Interpretation, and 
Cooperative Activities, with several branches under the Operations 
Division also being represented (Wirth, 1980). This committee was given 
the responsibility to develop the program. A "Steering Committee" was 
also established, consisting of the supervisors of the members of the 
Mission 66 Committee, which had the responsibility to "plan the scope 
and pattern" of the main committee study (Wirth memo, 1955). 
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Additionally, the regional offices established their own Mission 66 
committees and individual parks created working committees to plan 
projects at the park level (Wirth, 1980). 
During 1955 the Mission 66 Committee conducted pilot studies of 
several parks, set forth procedures, and directed each park to submit a 
prospectus of projects needed (Wirth, 1980). The prospectuses consisted 
primarily of updated park master plans. Individual park master plans 
had existed in the system for several years; Wirth (1980) states that 
they were essential to the Mission 66 program. 
The problems of the parks had gained such notoriety that President 
Eisenhower drew attention to them in his 1956 State of the Union 
address, stating that his administration would submit recommendations to 
provide more facilities for the public (Wirth, 1980). A bill for the 
M66 program was submitted to Congress and passed with appropriations of 
$786,545,000 (Vetter, 1957). The program began in July 1956 amid a 
great deal of publicity put out by the Park Service. Robert Barbee 
(pers. comm.) stated that "every [interpretive] program had to include 
some sort of discussion of Mission 66. It was a great propaganda 
effort. It was a stroke of genius to get a ten year commitment from 
Congress. That was unheard of." Once the program had started, the 
Mission 66 Committee was disbanded and the Steering Committee was 
enlarged and reorganized as the "Mission 66 Advisory Committee", and 
assigned to monitor the program (Wirth, 1980). 
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Mission 66 was conceived, designed, and organized almost entirely 
within the National Park Service. It came about largely because of 
public criticism of the deterioration of the units in the park system, 
but once the program began there was very little public input. 
Therefore the NPS was the most important actor involved in the policies 
of the program, and those policies reflected Wirth's strong 
anthropocentrism. In a manual entitled Mission 66 For the National Park 
System (USDI, 1956), sent out by the NPS Washington office to the field 
employees as an explanation of the program, the Mission 66 philosophy 
was enunciated. The Forward to the manual, entitled "The Basic Purpose 
of the National Park System", reinterpretes the National Park Service 
Act by reducing the Act's double mandate of preservation and use to a 
single mandate to "promote and regulate use": 
This act charges the National Park Service to do one 
thing—to promote and regulate the use of the parks. This is 
the one positive injunction placed upon the Service—a clear 
statement of Service responsibility. The intent of the 
remaining portion of this Act, which defines the purpose of 
the National Park System, is clear, but its language leaves 
room for interpretations which may obscure its true meaning. 
The Forward went on to define the national park system in strictly 
anthropocentric terms: 
The National Park System is a national resource—a 
natural resource, a historical resource, a cultural resource. 
Like minerals, timber, soil, or water, it is a resource that 
has meaning and value only when transmuted into products 
useful to man...the primary justification for a National Park 
System lies in its capacity to provide enjoyment in its best 
sense, now and in the future. 
The Forward did not go on to define "enjoyment in its best sense", but 
it did refer to the preservation aspect of park management by declaring: 
"To change the character of a park area in any important way destroys a 
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part of its ability to yield...benefits to the human mind and spirit." 
However, the meaning of "any important way" was not clarified, so what 
was considered important change cannot be determined. 
The National Park Service Act was referred to again in the main 
part of the manual, in a statement that clearly reflects the 
anthropocentric ideology of placing preservation within the context of 
recreation: 
"The law insisted that these areas were to be so managed that 
their natural qualities would remain unimpaired; for only if 
thus protected would they provide the fullest degree of 
enjoyment and inspiration for present and future Americans. 
Without the concept of public use and enjoyment the function 
of preservation and protection is without meaning, (emphasis 
added] 
The manual went on to state: "It is the task of the National Park 
Service, therefore, to assure the America people opportunity for maximum 
beneficial use and enjoyment." The use of the word "maximum" perhaps 
best reveals the approach of the Wirth administration toward park use. 
The word had not been used in policy statements prior to Mission 66. 
Mission 66 had a significant impact on virtually every unit of the 
national park system. The program was eventually responsible for the 
construction of: 1570 miles of reconstructed roads, 1197 miles of new 
roads, 936 miles of new and reconstructed trails, 330 parking areas, 575 
new camgrounds consisting of 17,782 campsites, 742 new picnic areas, 114 
visitor centers, 584 new comfort stations, and 50 marinas, boating 
ramps, and facilities; plus 535 new water systems, 521 new sewer 
systems, 271 power systems, 221 new administrative buildings, 218 new 
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utility buildings, as well as hundreds of employee residences, entrance 
stations, lookout towers, and interpretive exhibits (Wirth, 1980). 
CRITICISM OF MISSION 66 
The Mission 66 program was initially welcomed by the interested 
public as a dramatic step in the right direction. However, not too long 
after the program began doubts were expressed. Without specifically 
mentioning M66, Krutch (1957) wrote: 
Up until now the original purpose of the national parks 
and monuments has been fairly well preserved, partly as the 
result of more or less conscious policy, more perhaps because 
limitations of money and time have slowed down the tendency to 
prevent it. But now that the integrity of the parks is being 
increasingly threatened by would-be exploiters as well as by 
the simple pressure of an increasing population looking for 
"recreation"—a definite policy of protection from both ought 
to be formulated. Along with the question of "good roads", 
especially within the parks themselves, it would have to 
consider all the other "improvements" and "facilities" 
proposed and sometimes provided. 
He went further by stating that "parks should not be turned into 
resorts. And the distinction should be not how long the visitor stays, 
but why and under what inducement". He then went on to reflect upon 
Park Service philosopy and policy: 
Are parks doomed in their turn to become mere resorts? 
Ultimately perhaps. But how rapidly will depend largely upon 
the philosophy which the Park Service formulates and the 
support it can win for it. A wise one could make them last 
out not only my time and yours but that for generations yet to 
come. 
Some conservation groups also began to question Park Service policy 
early in the Mission 66 program. Everhart (1972) quoted the National 
Parks Association as stating in 1958: "Conservationists and the lovers 
of our national parks in general are becoming increasingly apprehensive 
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about the trend toward some national parks becoming recreational 
resorts." 
By 1961 criticism of M66 had become relatively widespread. As had 
been historically true, popular magazines were instrumental in making 
the issue public. In February of 1961 Atlantic Monthly published a 
series of articles under the heading "Our National Parks In Jeopardy". 
One article in the series (Brooks, 1961) referred to the "much disputed 
Mission 66", and hinted at some of the interest groups who pushed the 
Park Service to develop the parks: 
Some development is necessary; the danger today is that, 
under pressure, it may be going hog-wild. I venture to 
suggest that much of this activity—particularly the building 
of roads for fast cars and marinas for fast boats—is based 
on a mistaken premise. It is assumed that the public (as 
distinguished from the automobile and motorboat industries) 
demands these things and that the parks cannot be used without 
them. Is this true? 
The article went on to state: "This project, however legitimate its 
objectives, is sometimes being carried to excess. One can only hope for 
restraint, in both central planning and local execution." 
The architectural style by the Park Service during M66 also came 
under attack. Prior to the program, the "national park style" had been 
one of generally simple rustic buildings, built with native materials, 
which blended into the surrounding landscape (Wilson, 1976). However, 
another article in the series (Butcher, 1961) stated: 
Under Mission 66, too many of the parks are being 
cluttered with buildings of freak and austere design. No 
longer are the architects concerned with producing structures 
of beauty and charm that help to create a proper atmosphere 
and are inconspicuous and harmonious with their surroundings. 
Rather, they seem obsessed with designing monuments to their 
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own inventiveness. Widely critcized, these buildings are 
unlike any others in the parks and are creating a hodgepodge 
where, instead, there should be uniformity. 
The article went on to call for the Park Service to adopt a policy 
prohibiting construction of any further facilities in the central parts 
of the parks, and also advocated the construction of necessary 
facilities either just within the park entrances or outside the parks. 
The Park Service also drew considerable criticism from several 
conservation groups for the lack of resource protection, in particular 
wilderness protection, included in M66 policies. As early as 1951, a 
legally established "national wilderness preservation system" was 
proposed, and from 1957 to 1964 several versions of wilderness 
protective legislation were debated in Congress, culminating in the 
Wilderness Act of 1964 (Hash, 1973). Wirth and the Park Service were 
said to oppose a wilderness law (Craig, 1957), but Wirth (1980) claimed 
that the Service did not want to be "included in it because the 
protection section of the original bill was not as protective for 
national parks wilderness as our own basic legislation". However, 
Lemuel Garrison (pers. comm.), who served as the chairman of the 
Mission 66 Steering and Advisory Committees, stated that the Service 
felt that a wilderness bill "over-emphasized" the importance of 
wilderness in parks. Garrison (1983) also stated that he felt 
wilderness legislation was "redundant as it related to National Parks". 
Whatever the reason, the passage of wilderness legislation was not 
incorporated as an objective of M66, and that omission caused many 
conservation groups to turn against the program (Garrison, pers. 
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comm.)* 
STUART UDALL AND THE LEOPOLD REPORT 
A significant change occurred in the federal government during the 
Mission 66 program which led indirectly to a change in Park Service 
philosophy and policy. The program had begun with a Republican 
administration in the White House that fully supported it, but in 1960 a 
Democrat, John Kennedy, was elected president. While the Kennedy 
administration's policies regarding national parks did not publicly 
differ significantly from the Eisenhower administration's, there arose 
several disagreements between the Kennedy Interior Department and 
Wirth's National Park Service. First, Kennedy supported enactment of 
wilderness legislation (Wirth, 1980). Also, Kennedy favored the 
establishment of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR) (Chubb and 
Chubb, 1981) as an effort to begin comprehensive national outdoor 
recreation planning; the NPS, on the other hand, felt that the BOR was 
unnecessary and intruded upon the Park Service responsibility (Wirth, 
1980). 
Wirth (1980) cited incidents between the Kennedy Interior 
Department and the Park Service which suggest friction between the 
department and the agency, but the only public split in policy between 
the two came about because of a controversy regarding the management of 
elk in Yellowstone. Secretary of the Interior Stuart Udall established 
an Interior Department-level advisory board to examine the problem of 
wildlife management in the national parks. The board's report, 
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published in 1963 and known as the Leopold Report (Leopold et al., 
1963), dealt primarily with resource issues. However, it made 
recommendations for park management which differed with some of the 
principles of Mission 66. The report recommended that rather than 
providing for public use, the "primary goal" for park management should 
...that the biotic associations within each park be 
maintained, or where necessary recreated, as nearly as 
possible in the condition that prevailed when the area was 
first visited by the white man. A national park should 
represent a vignette of primitive America. 
The report then questioned the appropriateness of many of the facilities 
existing in the parks, including some being built under M66: 
...it seems incongruous that there should exist in the 
national parks mass recreation facilities such as golf 
courses, ski lifts, motorboat marinas, and other extraneous 
developments which completely contradict the management goal. 
We urge the National Park Service to reverse its policy of 
permitting these noconforming uses, and to liquidate them as 
expeditiously as possible (painful as this will be to 
concessionaires). Above all other policies, the maintenance 
of naturalness should prevail. 
Although the Leopold Report was not a rejection of existing NPS 
policy and did not specifically criticize the Mission 66 program, it did 
advocate a definite shift in NPS policy toward a more biocentric 
approach to management. It sought to direct the Park Service away from 
merely providing recreational opportunities toward scientifically 
managing the parks as complex ecosystems. It urged the Service to 
expand its research programs because of their importance as the basis 
for management decisions. 
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Because of the broad discretion left to the NPS in its organic act 
Mission 66 and the Leopold Report could both be construed by their 
respective proponents as appropriate under the law. Their differences 
reflected fundamental differences in their philosophical orientations 
toward management; the Leopold Report emphasized the preservation 
aspect of the Service's legal mandate, Mission 66 emphasized the 
promotion of use aspect. The Leopold Report can be regarded at least 
partly as a reaction to the rejection of Mission 66 philosophy by the 
interested public. The Park Service was directed by Udall to adopt the 
Leopold Report as policy (Barbee, pers. comm.), and while it is 
doubtful that the agency was completely pleased with the directive, 
visitation to the system in 1963 had exceeded the M66 estimate for 1966 
by 20 million people; the Service most certainly recognized that 
constructing facilities to keep up with visitation was no longer 
feasible, and probably also felt the need for an adjustment in policy. 
The Leopold Report became "a kind of manifesto" for the Park Service 
(Barbee, pers. comm.). 
Mission 66 did not culminate in the dramatic fashion Wirth had 
originally intended. In 1966 visitation to the system exceeded the M66 
estimate of 80 million people per year by over 53 million, in spite of 
several revisions of the M66 program (Wirth, 1980), and according to 
Garrison (pers. comm.) the Service did not end the program, it merely 
incorporated its objectives into long-term planning. Haines (1977) 
states that the program "passed quietly out of the picture" when Udall 
announced a new program entitled "Road to the Future", which 
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"deemphasized construction of facilities". Wirth retired in early 1964 
amid rumors that he was fired, but both he and Udall denied those rumors 
(Wirth, 1980). However, whether or not his resignation was due in any 
part to criticism of Mission 66 or to changes in policy dictated to the 
Park Service from the Interior Department or Congress is impossible to 
determine. 
Because of the long-term effects of M66, the program has remained a 
topic of discussion in the years since it ended. Darling and Eichhorn 
(1969) wrote: 
Thinking independently as individuals we have both felt 
uneasy about the conception of Mission 66. It has seemed to 
us that this operation over 10 years has been to increase 
visitation, making it easier to get into the national parks 
and that the visitors should be more comfortable in various 
ways once they are there. Mission 66 has done comparatively 
little for the plants and animals. 
Mission 66, instead of being a far-sighted planning operation 
to conserve these choice areas, seems to have been conceived 
to allow more complete infTitration and uncritical use. 
Hill (1972) called the program "a misguided spasm of political 
cosmetology...nominally aimed at improving the parks, but also at 
galvanizing public interest and stimulating appropriations". Udall 
(1972) was undoubtedly referring to M66 when he wrote: 
History has shown, incidentally, that "beneficent 
projects" of one period—the building of unneeded roads is a 
prime example—can be the bane of park administrators a few 
years later. 
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IMPORTANT ACTORS DURING THE MISSION 66 PROGRAM 
Placed in a historical context, the shift in national park 
management philosophy from the anthropocentric end of the spectrum 
toward the biocentric side that occurred in the early 1960's was 
dramatic. Therefore, a closer examination of the actors involved in 
that shift is necessary. 
Although Mission 66 policy was formulated and implementated within 
the Park Service, the major evaluator of the program was essentially the 
V 
Interior Department, in the form of the Leopold Committee. Spokesman 
for the public interest, largely through popular magazines, had provided 
the impetus for the Mission 66 program by serving as informal evaluators 
of previous policy, or lack of policy, after World War II. During the 
course of the program the print media was also the means through which 
informal public evaluation was expressed. By this time the public had 
become a very important actor in the policy process because of the 
tremendous increase in visitation to the parks, and organized 
conservation groups had also grown in size and strength. Organizations 
such as the Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club, and the National Parks 
Association were important not only for their objections to M66, but 
also for their efforts to convince Congress to pass wilderness 
legislation which placed a legal obligation on the Park Service to 
protect wilderness in parks. 
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If a single most important actor in the national park policy 
process during the period of the early 1960s is to be considered, that 
actor would be Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall. He was 
responsible not only for establishing the Leopold Committee and for 
directing that their recommendations be adopted as policy by the NPS, 
but he also reorganized the national park system in 1964, based on Park 
Service recommendations, into three management catagories—natural, 
recreational, and historical (Lee, 1974). This reorganization 
differentiated management policies for the various types of units of the 
system and established "principles of resource management, resource use, 
and physical development that should characterize each catagory" (Lee, 
1974). This reorganization pleased conservationists who had felt since 
the expansion of the system in 1933 that the preservation aspect of the 
Service mandate had been obscured by the addition of units set aside for 
recreational or historical purposes. 
Udall was probably the most active secretary in the policy 
formation environment of the park policy process, but more than that he 
was instrumental in initiating the environmental movement that arose in 
American society in the late 1960s. His years as secretary (1961 to 
1969) have been described by Barbee (pers. comm.) as "a heady 
time...incipient...sort of a conscious-building era before the 
environmental movement". Udall wrote a book in which he desribed the 
"quiet conservation crisis" of pollution, waste, and "vanishing beauty" 
facing the United States in the 1960s, and the need to develop a "land 
ethic for tomorrow" in which the "science of ecology" would be employed 
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to provide a high standard of living as well as an unspoiled environment 
(Udall, 1963). Udall as Secretary thus sought to change American 
attitudes toward the environment, and his efforts to shift the emphasis 
of national park policy toward a more biocentric approach were a part of 
his efforts to change the national conservation agenda. 
THE CONCESSIONS POLICY ACT 
While Congress helped to push the NPS toward more biocentric 
management by passing the Wilderness Act in 1964, the following year it 
passed the Concessions Policy Act (16 U.S.C.S. 20 et seq.), which 
indirectly helped to maintain a strong element of anthropocentrism in 
park policy. 
Concessions policy in the parks had historically been vague, and 
after World War II it became a substantial problem because of exploding 
visitation, NPS desires to accommodate all who wished to visit the 
parks, and expansion of concession facilities. Three government reports 
issued in 1963, two by Congressional committees and one by the General 
Accounting Office, "urged that concession contracts made little economic 
sense and that the government's policies amounted to subsidization of an 
industry that no longer needed it" (Mantel!, 1979). Concessioners 
objected to the studies and argued that policy changes recommended in 
the reports would "discourage investment of private capital" which could 
affect the quality of service and the rates charged to visitors 
(Mantel 1, 1979). Congress, sensitive to the desires of private business 
offering a public service and concerned about the potential for millions 
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of dissatisfied park visitors, responded by passing the Concessions 
Policy Act of 1965. 
The Act was intended to insure quality service to park visitors by 
protecting concessioners and insuring them a reasonable opportunity to 
make a profit. It gave legal support for the longstanding policy of 
monopolies in the parks, granted preferential rights to satisfactory 
concessioners in the granting of new contracts, and gave possessory 
interest to concessioners who constructed facilities within the parks. 
The Act limited concessions to "those that are necessary and appropriate 
for public use and enjoyment of the national park area in which they are 
located and that are consistent to the highest practicable degree with 
the preservation and conservation of the areas"; however, it did not 
define what facilities and services are to be considered "necessary and 
appropriate". Mantel 1 (1979) articulated the objections of critics of 
the Act: 
The Concessions Policy Act of 1965, outdated when 
written, has provided concessioners with too much protection. 
It has helped entrench concessioners in the parks and has 
enabled them to wield an unjustifiable degree of influence 
over management policy and to obscure the purpose of the 
parks. In order to stimulate investment and create more 
services, the Act's design was to assure the concessioners a 
profit. As a result, those services with a low cost, but high 
return ratio, such as souvenir stores, snack bars, and liquor 
stores are particularly favored. 
The Park Service has been entangled in a statutory web of 
promoting and encouraging use of concessions. Park 
preservation and the concept of the park experience providing 
a contrast which reinvigorates have been virtually forgotten, 
giving way initially to the political necessity of creating 
park use, then acceding to concessioner pressure and, finally, 
to "user" desires. 
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BIOCENTRISM SINCE MISSION 66 
In the late 1960s an environmental movement arose in the United 
States. Essentially begun by writers and scientists who warned of the 
consequences of the continued deterioration of the earth's environment, 
it was usually referred to as a revolution because it was an attempt to 
drastically change society's values. Unlike the conservation movement 
at the turn of the twentieth century, which was based in part in the 
fear of running out of resources, this movement was based on "ecological 
awareness [which] transcended concern for the quality of life to fear 
for life itself" (Nash, 1982). Man was seen as "part of a larger 
community of life, dependent for his survival on the survival of the 
ecosystem and on the health of the total environment" (Nash, 1982). The 
movement rejected the prevalent belief that advances in science and 
technology would solve environmental problems as they reached the 
critical point. Hence, the movement was a revolution because this "Myth 
of Scientific Supremacy" (Udall, 1963) was replaced with a desire to 
change the values of American society. Hardin (1968) explained the need 
for value changes when he argued that some problems had no technical 
solutions, but could be solved only by fundamental changes in human 
values. He presented the thesis that the earth was much like a commons 
shared by the entire human community and even seemingly insignificant 
actions by one affected the quality of life for everyone in the 
community. 
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The revolution, which consisted primarily of young people led by 
the writers and scientists, forced federal and state governments to 
assume a more active role in environmental protection. Among the 
important federal legislation passed were the Clean Air and Clean Water 
Acts (42 U.S.C.S. 25,1857-18571,1858,1858a and 33 U.S.C. 1151 et seq., 
respectively), the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.), and 
the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 
4321,4331-4335,4341-4347). 
The national parks were a focal point for the environmental 
revolution. They suffered from many of the same environmental problems 
as the rest of the country—pollution, overcrowding, extinction of 
wildlife species—and many felt that if those problems had already 
reached these areas especially preserved, then there was little hope for 
the rest of the nation. NPS Director Hartzog compared the parks to the 
miner's canary as an early warning system for the environment (Darling 
and Eichhorn, 1969). 
During this period perhaps more was written and spoken about the 
national parks than ever before in their history. Restatement of the 
purpose of the parks and the role they would play in American society in 
the future, redefinition of appropriate types of uses, and advocacy of 
limiting use were common themes. Udall (1972) wrote that "[t]he park 
idea will flourish only if it is constantly restated and made relevant 
to the values esteemed by future generations". In general, most of what 
was written during this time was very biocentric; the idea that the 
Park Service should seek to maximize use was generally considered 
Page 67 
obsolete and replaced with various ideas to limit the types of use 
allowed. Hill (1972) wrote: 
The environmental revolution is doing something to save 
the Park Service from its own follies of political 
accommodation. The clamor for an improved "quality of life" 
has included pressures to get the schlock out of the national 
parks and not let their use eclipse preservation. 
Conservation organizations were dominant actors in the efforts for 
biocentric policies during the enviromental revolution. The 
Conservation Foundation sponsored a study by an ecologist and a 
geographer that examined park policy. The report of that study (Darling 
and Eichhorn, 1969), first published in 1967, reiterated the Leopold 
Report's criticisms of park development and anthropocentric policies. 
It stated: 
If national parks are to continue to be a retreat from 
urban civilization for increasing numbers of people, much of 
what was permissible in the less-crowded past will need to be 
more carefully controlled or eliminated....the only absolute 
administrative principle in the National Park Service is to 
make ecological health or repose of an area the first 
consideration. 
The report ended by advocating limits on use and types of use: 
In conclusion, we foresee a time of greater realization 
that in an area of large, mobile, leisured populations, it is 
a privilege rather than an unheeded right to visit the superb 
national properties.... Certain forms of decorous behavior 
should be accepted and not questioned. The National Gallery 
of Art and the great museums expect and get such behavior 
within their precincts. The national parks of the United 
States present the glorious creations of nature and no 
expediency or misconception of their beauty must endanger the 
world heritage of which they are so shining a part. 
Page 68 
In 1968 Edward Abbey gained recognition as a radical 
environmentalist-writer. His extremely biocentric view of what the 
parks should be conflicted sharply with what he perceived them to be. 
He spoke out against the leisure-seeking park visitor, and attacked what 
he called "Industrial Tourism", the modern tourism which created and is 
dependent upon the travel industry (Abbey, 1968): 
Industrial Tourism is a big business. It means money. 
It includes the motel and restaurant owners, the gasoline 
retailers, the oil corporations, the road-building 
contractors, the heavy equipment manufacturers, the state and 
federal engineering agencies and the sovereign, all-powerful 
automotive industry. These various interests are well 
organized, command more wealth than most modern nations, and 
are represented in Congress with a strength far greater than 
is justified in any constitutional or democratic sense. 
(Modern politics is expensive—power follows money.) Through 
Congress the tourism industry can bring enormous pressure to 
bear upon such a slender reed in the executive branch as the 
poor old Park Service, a pressure which is also exerted on 
every other possible level—local, state, regional— and 
through advertising and the well-established habits of a 
wasteful nation... 
Industrial Tourism is a threat to the national parks. 
But the chief victims of the system are the motorized 
tourists. They are being robbed and robbing themselves. So 
long as they are unwilling to crawl out of their cars they 
will not discover the treasures of the national parks and will 
never escape the stress and turmoil of those urban-suburban 
complexes which they had hoped, presumably, to leave behind 
for a while. 
In 1972 the Conservation Foundation issued a report of a task force 
organized to coincide with the centennial of the creation of Yellowstone 
National Park (Conservation Foundation, 1972). The task force advocated 
preservation as the primary function of the NPS, restricting automobile 
use, turning concessions over to non-profit, quasi-public corporations, 
expanding biological and sociological research, and the NPS taking the 
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lead in environmental education; the biocentrically-oriented report 
also stressed the importance of wilderness management in national parks 
and elimination of inappropriate facilities and activities. 
Stewart Udall, almost four years after his term as Secretary of the 
Interior ended, joined in the discussions of the role of the national 
parks and how they should be used: 
The parks were not intended for these kinds of travelers, 
who come to the rims of canyons and the foothills of mountains 
to peer at the parks. The parks are preeminently for those 
who relish the rugged life and who are willing to get off the 
beaten paths and into the silent cathedrals of the out of 
doors. National parks must always be quintessentially nature 
parks, and their preferred customers will be those ready to 
make the physical effort to get acquainted with their secret 
places and catch the "barks and tonics" of their wilderness 
fragrances. (Udall, 1972) 
By 1974 the anthropocentrism of the Mission 66 era had been fully 
supplanted by biocentic park policy, at least in theory if not totally 
in practice. An assistant director of the Service wrote that 
n[iIndisputably preservation comes first in law. Indisputably it comes 
first in logic—without preservation the rest is utterly pointless" 
(Utley, 1974). His statement was a complete turnaround from the M66 
edict that "[w]ithout the concept of public use and enjoyment the 
function of preservation and protection is without meaning" (USDI, 
1956). 
Although the environmental revolution subsided by the mid-1970s 
environmental awareness did not end, and efforts to push the NPS toward 
more biocentric management continued. Sax (1980) perhaps wrote the 
definitive argument for the biocentric philosophy. He offered what he 
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called the "preservationist point of view"; in his opinion, "[t]he 
preservationist is not an elitist who wants to exclude others....he is a 
moralist who wants to convert them". He went on to describe the 
preservationist position: 
The preservationist does not condemn the activities he 
would like to exclude from the park. He considers them 
perfectly legitimate and appropriate—if not admirable—and 
believes that opportunities for conventional tourism are amply 
provided elsewhere: at resorts and amusement parks, on 
private lands, and on a very considerable portion of the 
public domain too. He only urges a recognition that the parks 
have a distinctive function to perform that is separate from 
the service of conventional tourism, and that they should be 
managed explicitly to present that function to the public as 
their principal goal, separate from whatever conventional 
tourist services they may also have to provide. 
Like Olmsted a hundred years before, Sax based his argument of what 
constitutes appropriate park use, not on the activities and facilities 
provided for the park visitor, but on the attitudes the visitor brings 
to the park and the atmosphere the manager provides for the visitor. He 
stressed the importance of the experience the visitor derived from his 
visit; those activities which afforded the visitor an unconstrained 
experience which involved some form of risk and challenge to the 
individual were to be encouraged by management. He referred to such 
activities as "reflective" or "contemplative" recreation, and stated: 
Rather than seeking mainly to serve the wide variety of 
recreational preferences visitors bring with them, park 
managers would encourage all visitors—whatever their past 
experiences or skills—to try more challenging and demanding 
recreation. While the Park Service may believe it is doing 
this effectively now, the actual pattern of park visitations 
suggests a quite different conclusion. 
Sax said the issue of automobiles in parks was "not an issue of 
transportation, but of pace"; the automobile tourist was simply not 
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induced to get out of his vehicle and engage in contemplative 
recreation. He argued that the purpose of having natural areas 
preserved was "to expose, rather than to insulate", in order for the 
visitor to more fully experience the unique character of the area. 
Sax argued that the Park Service should seek to "unbundle" their 
goals. Rather than trying to be all things to all people they should 
provide an opportunity for a specific type of recreational experience, 
by encouraging contemplative recreation. He attacked concessions 
policy: 
Under the present practice, with a plethora of concessioners 
offering a wide variety of services, and with strong economic 
incentives to stimulate additional clientele, the system works 
to bundle together as much as possible of what should be 
separate. Under the approach suggested here, the emphasis 
would be on the maximum possible separation ...Supportive 
services—supply stores, unpretentious restaurants associated 
with hotels, and gas stations in more remote parks— are also 
perfectly appropriate. What do not belong in such places are 
facilities that are attractions in themselves, lures that have 
nothing to do with facilitating an experience of the natural 
resources around which the area has been established. 
He cited souvenir shops, swimming pools, and organized concessioner 
activities such as horseback rides as inappropriate because they 
discouraged the visitor from experiencing the park himself. 
Sax's argument is uniquely biocentric because it focuses on the 
visitor's experience rather than the appropriateness of facilities or 
developments. To him the attitudes behind visitor behavior and 
management policy were the important considerations; any activity or 
development could be considered appropriate in the parks as long as it 
facilitated the experience he felt should be derived from them. Certain 
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developments simply tended to discourage the visitor from seeking the 
experiences Sax advocated. His biocentrism was a result of his belief 
that only by preserving the natural qualities of national park and f ^ 
allowing the visitor to experience it on an individual basis 
unencumbered by mass recreation facilities and activities could the 
visitor be insured of obtaining the desired recreational experience. 
McCool (1983) believes, like Sax, that recreational preferences are 
changing. He based his opinion on the wave theory presented by Toffler 
(1980). Toffler theorized that cultural development occurs in waves. 
The First Wave, which lasted thousands of years, dominated early 
cultural development and was characterized by small agrarian communities 
with primitive technology and substantial leisure time, used primarily 
for religious celebrations. The Second Wave was characterized by the 
Industrial Revolution, with more urban societies, advanced technology, 
and limited, structured leisure time. The Third Wave, which is now 
overtaking society today, is characterized by greatly increased 
technology, flexible work schedules, and a shift of the work place back 
to the home; all of which help decentralize society. The Third Wave is 
also characterized by increased, flexible leisure time. 
McCool asserted that the Third Wave has important implications for 
recreation managers such as the Park Service: 
...recent trends in recreation activity participation suggest 
that the Third Wave holds the possibility of major surprises. 
Less emphasis on entertainment, more focus on involvement, 
appreciation rather than consumption, self actualization in 
place of mass amusement. These suggest that the park 
experience may be more demanding—and more rewarding—for 
both the visitor and the manager. 
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Thus McCool, like Sax, believes that recreational preferences in 
the future will be more physically and mentally demanding, and less 
convenience- oriented than in the past; Should this be the case, it 
follows that biocentric management will be most able to provide those 
types of activities; structured activities designed to entertain the 
visitor which were favored under the anthropocentric philosophy will be 
less in demand. 
In 1980 Ronald Reagan was elected president, and his choice for 
secretary of the Interior, James Watt, became perhaps the most active 
secretary since Stewart Udall. However, Watt's policies differed 
significantly from Udall's. He firmly believed in maximum resource 
development on all available public lands, even on wilderness; his 
philosophy toward the parks was one of extreme anthropocentrism, and he 
pushed for their maximum use by the public. His federal land policies 
were a 180 degree turnaround from the trend in policy that had developed 
over the previous twenty years. 
In 1981 Watt spoke at a conference of national park concessioners. 
His speech reflected the strong anthropocentrism upon which he based his 
policy. Frome (1981) quoted parts of the speech. Referring to the 
concessioners, Watt stated: 
You are going to play a tremendously important and 
growing role in the administration of our national parks, and 
we are going to reach out to involve you in some areas that 
you haven't been asked to be involved in before. 
As had been done during the Mission 66 period, he placed preservation of 
the parks within the context of recreation when he stated, "I will err 
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on the side of public use versus preservation". He essentially made the 
concessioners the dominant actor in the park policy process by stating, 
"Don't be hung up on protocol. If a personality is giving you a 
problem, we're going to get rid of the problem or the personality, 
whichever is faster". 
Conservation groups and those in the public who supported the 
trends in park policy since the Leopold Report objected vociferously to 
Watt's statements. Many immediately began to call for his resignation. 
He eventually did resign, for reasons other than his federal land 
policies, and it is doubtful that he significantly altered the trend in 
park policy away from the biocentrism that had begun twenty years 
earlier. Watt's policies were compared to those of the federal 
government in the nineteenth century which had advocated conquering the 
Western frontier. Nash (1982) spoke for many of Watt's critics when he 
stated that "[t]he Reagan administration's championing of the frontier 
perspective might be a final flare-up of values approaching 
obsolescence". 
SUMMARY 
Although the first suggestions for establishing national parks were 
generally based in biocentric philosophy, the first national park was 
reserved primarily for anthropocentric reasons. Policy has historically 
shifted along a continuum between anthropocentrism and biocentrism, 
however an element of biocentrism has existed in management policy, even 
during periods when anthropocentrism dominated. In the early 1960s, 
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increased understanding of ecological interactions in natural systems 
and changing public attitudes helped cause a dramatic shift in park 
policy from extreme anthropocentrism to biocentrism. In the years since 
that shift arguments for biocentric management of the parks have gained 
in intensity and strength. 
The earliest and perhaps most persistent national park advocates 
throughout park history have been popular writers and artists who, 
through their works, have publicized and popularized the parks. 
However, national parks became a reality largely through the efforts of 
economic interests. These interests have grown and diversified as 
visitation to the parks has increased. The growth of the conservation 
movement in the early twentieth century, and subsequently the 
environmental revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, established a park 
constituency concerned primarily with preservation of natural values. 
These "preservationists" generally have biocentrism as their 
philosophical basis, while the economic interests generally favor 
anthropocentrism. Most park management controversies have resulted from 
the conflicting perceptions these groups have of what national parks 
should be. 
CHAPTER THREE: 
A CASE STUDY OF GRANT VILLAGE 
INTRODUCTION 
The road system that exists today in Yellowstone National Park 
essentially follows the same course as the first roads in the Park, 
which were designed by the Park's second superintendent. The roads loop 
through the interior of the Park in a figure-eight (referred to as the 
"Grand Loop") with auxiliary roads connecting the loops to the five park 
entrances. The roads were originally built to transport tourists to the 
most outstanding features, and Park accommodations were historically 
built at most of the scenic points-of-interest: Mammoth Hot Springs, 
Upper Geyser Basin (Old Faithful), West Thumb Geyser Basin, the north 
shore of Yellowstone Lake (near the outlet of the Yellowstone River), 
the Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone River, Tower Falls, and Fountain 
Paint Pots (facilities there no longer exit). (See Fig. 2) 
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EARLY PLANNING 
By the 1930s NPS personnel recognized that having major visitor 
facility developments located on or near fragile areas or areas of 
significant scenery, such as geyser basins and the Canyon rim, was 
detrimental to the scenic beauty of the area. In 1935 the Park master 
plan included recommendations for relocating the road and some 
facilities away from the Old Faithful area, and in 1936 the master plan 
recommended relocating facilities away from the West Thumb Geyser Basin 
as well (Wirth, 1980). The development at West Thumb had been built in 
the 1920s and 1930s at the "wye" formed by the junction of the Lower 
Loop road and the south entrance road, and included a ranger station, a 
general store, a photo shop, a cafeteria, tourist cabins, a boat office, 
a boat dock, and support facilities (Yellowstone Park Master Plan, 
1953). By this time concessions in the Park were divided between three 
family-run concessioners: the photo shops (now operated by Hamilton 
Stores) were run by Haynes Photo; the general stores were run by 
Hamilton Stores; the lodging, dining, transportation, horse rides, and 
boating facilities were run by Yellowstone Park Company (YPCO); and the 
gas stations were run jointly by Hamilton and YPCO (USDI, 1976). These 
concessioners had helped direct planning toward having commercial 
facilities at the "wye", but after World War II the NPS cited increased 
visitation, travel trends, and encroachment upon the thermal area as 
reasons for moving these facilities from the site (Yellowstone Park 
Master Plan, 1953). The area south of the West Thumb development was 
surveyed, following the shoreline of Thumb Bay in 1946 and 1947 (Haines, 
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pers. comm.), and in 1947 a decision to relocate the West Thumb 
facilities was made at a field meeting "at which many of the interested 
parties including the concessioners were present" (Yellowstone Park 
Master Plan, 1953). Also according to the 1953 master plan the 
campground, service station, and garage would have remained at the 
"wye", but by 1949 the NPS decided it would be desirable to have "the 
wye free of all commercial development". It was at this time that NPS 
Director Drury had recommended moving concessions facilities and 
administration buildings out of congested areas of the national parks, 
and although the West Thumb move was suggested before Drury was 
director, his recommendations most certainly gave new impetus to the 
idea in the years after World War II. 
However, the relocation was not carried out in those post-war 
years. In fact, no on-site work was done between 1947 and 1956 (Haines, 
pers. comm.), primarily due to the financial shortcomings of both the 
Park Service and the concessioners. Concession facilities continued to 
deteriorate after the War, as they had during the War when most 
facilities were closed, largely due to Yellowstone Park Company's 
financial problems (Haines, 1977). Concessions in the Park had never 
been particularly sound financially, and the lack of income during the 
War had left YPCO especially vulnerable. The Northern Pacific Railroad 
had been a financial backer of the company since the early days of the 
Park (Bartlett, 1983), but by the end of World War II had recognized 
that the automobile would continue to be the primary means of 
transportation for tourists and decided to end their financial support 
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of YPCO (Haines, 1977). 
As the post-war financial problems increased so too did the numbers 
of visitors to the Park, along with visitor dissatifaction. The state 
of Wyoming recognized the adverse effects visitor dissatisfaction in 
Yellowstone could have on the state's economy. A study conducted in 
1950 estimated that Park traffic generated almost $19 million worth of 
business in the immediate vicinity (Haines, 1977). In February of 1955, 
the Wyoming State Legislature passed a proposal for the state to 
purchase YPCO's operation (Haines, 1977). It was that same month and 
year that Wirth conceived the idea that was to become Mission 66 (Wirth, 
1980), and Haines (pers. comm.) believes that the M66 program was in 
effect a direct response to the Wyoming effort to gain control of 
Yellowstone concessions; the NPS was vigorously opposed to the proposal 
because of the potential for problems of state involvement in federal 
land management. Aside from the possibility that it provided the spark 
for the M66, the Wyoming proposal was important because it showed the 
importance the state placed on having adequate concession facilities 
within the Park. 
The proposal went no further because YPCO received a loan from 
Eastern banking interests in 1956 to replace the backing of the Northern 
Pacific Railroad, who had liquidated its interest in the company in 1955 
(Haines, pers. comm.). Yellowstone Park Company then had its 
concession contract renewed by the Park Service in 1956, and part of the 
contract was a promise to build their part of the Canyon Village project 
(planned to replace the development located along the Canyon rim) as the 
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first phase of the Mission 66 program in Yellowstone (King, pers. 
comm.). 
MISSION 66 IN YELLOWSTONE 
With the beginning of Mission 66 new emphasis was placed on 
improving and relocating facilities as called for in Park master plans, 
as well as on building new developments. The Mission 66 program for 
Yellowstone (USDI, undated), based on the recommendations of the Park 
Working Committee (which consisted of the superintendent and other Park 
administrators), called for doubling the number of lodging 
accommodations within the Park, more than doubling campground capacity, 
and increasing other visitor services. Specific developments called for 
were: Canyon Village (already under construction at the time the 
program for Yellowstone was written) consisting of a campground and 500 
cabins, plus stores, a restaurant, a visitor center, cabin office, and 
snack shop built in a horseshoe shape around three sides of a parking 
plaza; a recreational vehicle campground and expanded campground at 
Fishing Bridge (at the outlet of the Yellowstone River from Yellowstone 
Lake); Grant Village (originally to be called "Thumbbay"), to be 
located 1.5 miles south of West Thumb along Yellowstone Lake, and 
intended to replace the West Thumb development; Bridge Bay, located 
approximately two miles from Lake Hotel along the shore of Yellowstone 
Lake, consisting of a campground and marina and intended to replace the 
boat docks in front of Lake Hotel and at Fishing Bridge; Firehole 
Village, suggested to possibly begin late in the M66 program and 
intended as a replacement for facilities at Old Faithful. The entire 
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program was intended to increase guest capacity in the Park from 8,500 
to approximately 14,500, with most of the increase coming from 
construction of new cabins. This figure was not a ceiling on the guest 
capacity of the Park, but was what was believed to be necessary to meet 
the demand for overnight accommodations in the coming years. 
As evidence of the magnitude of the concessions problems in 
Yellowstone as viewed by the Park Service, in 1956 Lemuel Garrison, 
chairman of the Mission 66 Advisory Committee, was sent from the 
Washington Office of the NPS to be superintendent. He was instructed to 
get the program for the Park under way, and within a year Canyon 
Village, which had been in the planning stage for twenty years, was open 
to the public (Haines, 1977). Canyon Village was one of the first 
projects begun under the system-wide M66 program and was used as a focal 
point for the program; it was presented as an example of what M66 would 
do for the national parks. The groundbreaking ceremony at Canyon was 
highly publicized, and attended by "Assistant Secretary of the Interior 
Wesley A. D'Ewart, National Park Service Director Conrad L. Wirth, 
State officials of Idaho, Montana and Wyoming, members of Congress and 
representatives of conservation and business groups" (USDI press 
release, 1956). 
PROBLEMS WITH CANYON VILLAGE 
Yellowstone Park Company estimated that their part of the 
construction at Canyon Village would cost $2.5 million, but the final 
cost was much higher, due to it being built on a cost-plus basis, which 
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caused more serious financial problems for the company (Haines, pers. 
comm.). Garrison (pers. comm.) however, denied that construction of 
Canyon caused the company problems; he stated that their problems were 
due to accounting errors and poor management. 
Whatever the cause of the company's financial problems, they were 
compounded after Canyon Village was opened. Although the old lodge on 
the Canyon rim had been razed when the Village was built, the old Canyon 
Hotel remained open to the public and was filled to capacity almost 
every night during the 1957 and 1958 seasons; the new Village, more 
expensive to stay in, "went begging" (Haines, 1977). That trend was "so 
inimical to that precarious financing on which Canyon Village was based 
that the Yellowstone Park Company decided to abandon the hotel in order 
that the Canyon Village units might be filled and the investment there 
made to pay its way" (Haines, 1977). The hotel was then sold for 
salvage in 1959 and its hulk accidently burned in 1960 (Haines, 1977). 
However, eliminating competition from their own hotel did not solve 
YPCO's financial problems: 
...even that massive sacrifice was insufficient. The cost of 
the Canyon Village development was more than the Yellowstone 
Park Company could bear; just a hair's-breath short of 
bankruptcy its affairs were placed under the management of a 
board representing the mortgage holders. (Haines, 1977) 
Hence, the bankers who backed YPCO must have felt, like Garrison, that 
the company's problems were at least partly due to mismanagement. 
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FURTHER PROBLEMS WITH YELLOWSTONE PARK COMPANY 
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulty the concessioner had with 
Canyon Village, the NPS pushed forward with Grant Village. No on-site 
work had been done from the time the area was surveyed in 1947 until 
surveying was restarted in 1957 (Haines, pers. comm.). The Western 
Office of Design and Construction of the NPS, located in San Francisco, 
took over the project from park level planners in 1959 (NPS Advisory 
Board (1), undated). In 1961 the government cleared the forest (Haines, 
corr.) and began construction of their part of the Grant Village 
facilities. By 1962 roads, utilities, a campground, and a boat launch 
were complete and opening ceremonies were held (NPS Advisory Board (1), 
undated). The Village was dedicated and named for President Ulysses 
Grant, who had signed the Yellowstone Act into law. 
In 1963 the NPS Division of Concessions Management in Washington, 
DC, hired the director of the University of Denver Hotel School, Dr. 
Ralph Wilson, to study Yellowstone Park concessioners (Flynn memo, 
1964). Dr. Wilson's report was extremely critical of YPCO. In a 
letter to Superintendent Garrison, Wilson summarized what the study had 
concluded about the company (Wilson letter, 1963): 
In the past few years there has been a lack of adequate 
operating management present in the YPCO and as a result no 
positive plans or continuity of operation has resulted. No 
positive leadership has been exercised and at the present time 
the Company is looking to the Park Service for ideas as to 
necessary services and facilities. It is also quite evident 
that a conflict of ideas exist between the ownership of the 
company and the management committee. The demands for 
dividends and the demands for money for new construction and 
remodeling are in constant conflict. The management committee 
has little or no equity ownership but does have operating 
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interests in the earnings and continued life of the company. 
Wilson went on to state the company's financial situation was such that 
rehabilitation of facilities and construction of new facilities could 
not be accomplished using the company's potential earnings, and that the 
Park Service had allowed "accommodations 'slums'" to develop in the 
Park. He stated that "services provided by the YPCO to the visitors of 
Yellowstone Park left much to be desired in the way of cleanliness of 
the rooms, adequate service in the dining rooms, coffee shops and 
cafeterias", and that the quality of food and service deteriorated in 
the latter half of the summer season due to lack of employees. Wilson 
felt that room rates could be lowered to be comparable to rates charged 
in communities surrounding the Park. He also noted that little or no 
screening was done when the company hired its seasonal employees, and 
stated that substandard housing for employees contributed to attitude 
problems. 
With regard to Grant Village, Wilson wrote: 
That [sic] it is economically feasible for 150 motor 
hotel units with coffee shop and other services to be built at 
Grant Village. The construction should be adequate space 
accommodations but not luxury accommodations...The area will 
develope [sic] slowly and plans for additional motel units 
should be made for construction when demand develops. 
He made suggestions about solving the company's financial problems: 
The financial condition of the YPCO is such that 
consideration must be given to means other than profit to 
provide funds necessary for rehabilitation, remodeling, and 
new construction... 
Due to the need for capital funds for remodeling, general 
upgrading of facilities, and the need for new construction it 
is not desireable for the YPCO to declare stockholder 
dividends in the near future. Without possible dividends and 
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since ownership and management have been separated in the 
company it would be to the owners benefit to sell the YPCO to 
a more financially sound operating company. 
That same year Garrison informed the company "that the quality of 
their service was so poor that I felt their contract was in jeopardy. 
This created a major fracas, and unfortunately the major drive seemed to 
be to get me fired, instead of improving service" (Garrison, 1983). 
During the next two years the Service pressured YPCO to build their 
part of Grant Village, but the company refused, claiming that they could 
not secure construction capital (NPS Advisory Board (1), undated). In 
1964, Dr. Wilson issued a supplemental report to his 1963 study (NPS 
Advisory Board (1), undated). That report dealt with concession 
financing of the proposed Grant Village, which was planned at the time 
to consist of "2,700 pillows [number of overnight guests in lodging 
facilities] in 414 motel units, 240 kitchen apartment units, 246 canvas 
cabins, and 900 seats in coffee shop and cafeteria feeding units" 
(Wilson, 1964). The report (Wilson, 1963) found that a twenty year loan 
to cover 100 per cent of construction cost of the development would make 
the project feasible for the company, but recommended consideration of 
having another, more financially sound, company than YPCO building and 
operating Grant. The report stated that "the investment of some equity 
capital rather than one hundred [per cent] financing would improve the 
profit possibilities of the operation". The company still did not act, 
but in spite of YPCO's recalcitrance, the NPS continued to build their 
part of the Village. Garrison was transferred to Omaha to head the 
Midwest Region of the NPS that same year (Haines, 1977), and to what 
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extent his battle with concessioners over Grant Village contributed to 
the decision to transfer him is impossible to determine. He had other 
conflicts with interest groups from the Yellowstone region during his 
tenure in the Park, and it is possible that there simply was too much 
friction in the political climate for him to continue to be an effective 
administrator. 
LEMUEL GARRISON AND GRANT VILLAGE 
Garrison's role in Yellowstone during Mission 66 was extremely 
important and thus deserves closer analysis. He described his reasons 
for strongly supporting the completion of Grant Village (Garrison, 
1983): 
The creation of Grant Village was one of the "horizon" 
events from the beginning. I encouraged it because we needed 
to replace the West Thumb complex. Hamilton's Store was new 
and adequate. Everything else was dilapidated. The public 
campground was worn out by our standards—road ruts, dust, 
crowded, and scant vegetation; however, campers used it and 
used it. Overnight cabins were forlorn and maintenance was 
poor. A tiny dock and marina were inadequate. Roads, 
campers, playing children, all were mixed up with each other 
around the boat areas. The abrasive gravel land surface of 
West Thumb lacked dignity, usability, safety, and information 
services. Yet it was at a major road intersection, and from 
the shoreline we had a great view up the lake to the Absaroka 
Mountains and "the Wilderness." 
We had so much wilderness. It was a popular topic of 
planning. But there had been few access points. Grant 
Village would become the wilderness take-off point. Trails 
would lead to Heart Lake and Flat Mountain Arm. A short trail 
from Lewis Lake would provide access to Shoshone Lake and on 
into the Bechler River country. The interpretive theme of our 
visitor center would be "The Wilderness and Ways to Enjoy It." 
Our new marina would be a takeoff point for canoes, and 
include a major campground, a campfire circle, and a visitor 
center. This would be a great congregation point. 
Garrison (1983) described himself as "both user- and preservation-
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oriented". He felt that proper development could reduce human impacts 
on the resource (Garrison, 1964); he referred to his concept as 
"development as a tool of preservation" (Garrison, 1973), and was 
therefore, in his own words, "development oriented" to that extent 
(Garrison, pers. comm.). He reflected the desire to accommodate 
increasing visitation and the ambivalence toward wilderness that existed 
in the NPS during Mission 66 when he stated: 
The whole thrust at that point in time was to serve more 
visitors. Travel was on the upswing. The roads could handle 
more cars with only minor work, such as turn-outs, vista 
clearing, and curve straightening. But the pressing need was 
for visitor services. We were still destroying wilderness. 
Grant Village was a normal outcome of this growth pattern in 
1963. (Garrison, 1983) 
Although he was a primary architect for the system's Mission 66 
program, and was sent to Yellowstone to carry the program out there, it 
is important to recognize that he came to realize that the Service could 
not continue to attempt to provide accommodations for all who wished to 
visit Yellowstone. Garrison (1973) reflected on the situation as it 
existed at the time: 
In the context of the times, we were still operating under the 
principle that every visitor that wanted to come to 
Yellowstone, you'd let him in. If he wanted to camp, you 
tried to provide a campground for him. We got off of that 
before very long because it became obvious we had to do 
something in restriction...camping, for instance. We built 
the Madison Junction Campground, rebuilt it, enlarged it. We 
built the West Thumb, or Grant Village Campground, but it was 
so obvious that to really meet the forward demand, we would 
end up with a ring of campgrounds around Yellowstone Lake from 
Grant Village through to Mary Bay, which was about 33 miles, 
and they'd be full all the time. This was a perversion of the 
purpose of the park. So we just finally, I say finally, it 
wasn't too late in coming, adopted the principle we just 
weren't going to expand our campgrounds at all. Weren't going 
to add any more camp capacity. So that, I think, was one of 
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the major decisions,...! look at it as a wise decision. 
Garrison faced several controversies during his term as Yellowstone 
Superintendent. Besides Grant Village, there was an intense public 
debate over the Service's elk reduction program; the argument reached 
the Secretary of the Interior's office and led to the Leopold Report. 
However, perhaps the hottest local issue he had to deal with was the 
reaction of boating interests to his proposal to close portions of 
Yellowstone Lake to motorboats. Boating on the Lake had been a 
tradition that originated in the late nineteenth century, and after 
World War II had become very popular, especially with people from 
surrounding communities. Garrison's proposal drew such criticism from 
local, as well as national boating clubs, that there were a series of 
Congressional hearings held in the Park and surrounding communities 
(Garrison, 1973). A compromise zoning system was finally approved, but 
it is likely that the controversy had a negative effect on Garrison's 
effectiveness. The controversy is particularly important to 
understanding Garrison's role in the histories of Mission 66 and Grant 
Village because although he was responsible for the construction of two 
marinas that were intended to accommodate those who wished to boat on 
Yellowstone Lake, he risked his career by proposing a zoning system 
which was intended to protect the wildlife of the Lake and to keep the 
numbers of boat users down. 
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Garrison was replaced by John McLaughlin in 1964. 
GENERAL HOST CORPORATION 
In 1966 the NPS director wrote Secretary Udall about YPCO's failure 
to build Grant Village, and Superintendent McLaughlin proposed 
construction of an initial 500 rooms by 1972, with 400 more to be built 
later if visitor trends indicated the need (NPS Advisory Board (1), 
undated). In that same year YPCO was sold to Goldfield Corporation, 
which "through various mergers and acquisitions, evolved into the 
General Host Corporation" (USDI, 1976), a "mini-conglomerate" (Frome, 
1981) which was granted a thirty-year lease to operate all of YPCO's 
facilities and services with the provision that they build "500 housing 
units and related facilities at a cost of not less than $5 million by 
the end of 1971 at Grant Village" (NPS Advisory Board (2), undated). 
Overall the contract "required that a minumum capital expenditure [$10 
million], according to a specified schedule of projects [primarily Grant 
Village] be completed by December 31, 1975", and if the company did not 
comply, its contract could be terminated (USDI, 1976). 
Thus by the late 1960s the government had built at Grant Village a 
visitor center and ranger station, as well as a marina, a campground, 
roads, utilities, and parking lots, and had cleared the forest where the 
lodging was to be located. In all, it had spent $7 million (Anzelmo, 
per. comm.) and finally had a commitment from the concessioner to 
complete the development. 
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However, in 1969 a feasibility study of Grant Village was done by a 
private firm hired by the new Yellowstone Park Company (NPS Advisory 
Board (2), undated). The study found that it would be difficult for the 
company to recoup its investment from room revenues because of the short 
season (Edlund, pers. comm.) and maintenance costs (King, pers. 
comm.), and thus concluded that Grant Village was not economically 
feasible (Edlund, pers. comm.). 
Jack Anderson, who replaced McLaughlin as Yellowstone 
superintendent in 1966 (Anderson, pers. comm.), recommended in 1970 
minimal development at Grant Village to make it an "operational entity" 
(NPS Advisory Board (1), undated). Anderson's recommendations included 
converting the parking lots already in place into a recreational vehicle 
campground and having it and the campground already in place as the only 
overnight facilities (Anderson, pers. comm.). Anderson (pers. comm.) 
thought Grant Village was a mistake, citing bad climate, short season, 
snow levels, wind, and the presence of grizzly bears as reasons, and 
suggested to the Director that the NPS "take our red face and walk back 
to Congress and say, 'We made a real mistake here. We think we should 
pull out.1" (Anderson, pers. comm.) 
The Director did not take Anderson's advice, but instead sought 
another solution to the concessioner problem. According to Everhart 
(1972) the Director went to Congress: 
Testifying before the House Appropriations committeee in 
April, 1971, the Park Service Director announced that almost 
one-third of all park concessioners lost money in 1970 and 
that an equal number, from a financial point of view, could be 
considered only marginal operations. He informed the 
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committee that he intended to request appropriations to 
purchase the holdings of General Host and concluded, "I am 
confident that that is just a prelude to buying out the 
possessory interests of a number of other concessions". 
However, the Office of Management and Budget turned down his request 
(Everhart, 1972). 
THE YELLOWSTONE MASTER PLAN OF 1973 
By the early 1960s the Mission 66 program for Yellowstone was being 
criticized just as was the nation-wide program. Butcher (1961) 
expressed a lengthy opinion about M66 in Yellowstone: 
Yellowstone is the scene of one of the most expansive and 
elaborate of Mission 66 projects. A lodge and cabins were 
torn down on the south rim of the spectacular canyon of the 
Yellowstone River. Well rid of the unsightly structures, this 
beauty spot is being restored to nature; but across the 
canyon and back in the woodland, a whole new village has been 
built, complete with lodge, dozens of boxlike cabins for 
visitors, two two-story dormitories for employees, a 
concessioner's office building, store, visitor center, and a 
large parking area. 
As elsewhere, the Park Service built a case to justify 
this big development. It is said that Yellowstone is so vast 
and remote that it cannot be experienced in a single day, and 
visitors need facilities to enable them to remain in the park 
either overnight or for a week or more. The park prospectus 
explains that Yellowstone visitors will reach an estimated two 
million by 1966 and that overnight accommodations must be 
expanded from the 8500 capacity of 1955 to 15,000 in 1966; 
and this calls for increased housing, food, medical supplies, 
and other services of a "small city." More visitors' 
facilities require more employees. Together with utilities, 
this project has cost $70 million. Concerning the removal of 
the earlier development, a Park Service release quoted 
Director Conrad L. Wirth as saying, "The old development is 
an intrusion on the natural scene which the Service is charged 
by law to preserve." How could the director fail to see that 
the new village is an even greater intrusion on the natural 
scene? 
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Two more villages are scheduled for the park: Grant 
Village, to be even larger than Canyon Village, at the west 
side of Yellowstone Lake; and Firehole Village, near Old 
Faithful. 
One thing leads to another: Up to now, the Park Service 
and the concessioner have supplied the park's electricity with 
thirty diesel-powered generators. Because of the expansion, 
commercial power, says the service, has become a necessity; 
and as this is written, Yellowstone's forests are being cut to 
make way for power lines, many miles of them—further marring 
the park's beauty. 
Yellowstone was our first national park, established by 
Act of Congress in 1872. It was made accessible during the 
stagecoach era. Long distances and slow travel required that 
hotels and camps be located at the end of each day's journey. 
Today, smooth roads and fast automobiles do away with the 
necessity to stay in the park overnight; yet the National 
Park Service still administers it as though we were living in 
the old days. 
Darling and Eichhorn (1969) were also very critical of Mission 66 
developments in Yellowstone: 
Canyon Village is another seasonal community which covers 
large acreage and is difficult to justify in its present 
position. It could just as well have been outside the park 
and would have played a larger part in the economy of the 
state of Wyoming. In addition to a large plaza with 
supermarket and gift stores and art shop, there are 1,500 
duplex cabins where one can distinctly hear his neighbor 
breathing in sleep, though this is the pleasantest sound to 
come through the flimsy walls. Our stay there conveyed to us 
none of what we have heard called the national park 
experience; or perhaps this is the modern national park 
experience,... Some would justify the existence of Canyon 
Village because of its proximity to points of high scenic 
value in the park. We would take the view that this is a 
prime reason why Canyon Village should not be there. 
The same objections apply to trailer camps and automobile 
camps. They could be outside the park. The trees have 
completely disappeared from parts of that national park slum 
called Fishing Bridge; many trees were felled to make the 
large new trailer and automobile camp at Grant Village, where 
the rest of the trees are blowing down through lack of support 
and shelter by their fellows. The very term "village" 
indicates the present dangerous trend of thinking in national 
parks. We were in Grant Village just before its dedication 
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and were depressed by the sense of dereliction already 
palpable, for the village was by then occupied. 
After the end of the M66 program, the NPS began a new master plan 
process. The new master plan process was a re-adjustment of Mission 66 
(Anderson, pers. comm.), no doubt in response to critics such as those 
previously quoted. The Director established a study team to develop a 
regional master plan for Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Parks. 
The team consisted of Yellowstone Superintendent John McLaughlin and 
Grand Teton Superintendent Jack Anderson (who later replaced McLaughlin 
as Yellowstone Superintendent), as well as a representative of the NPS 
Denver Field Office, the Midwest Regional Associate Director, 
representatives of the Izaak Walton League and the Wildlife Management 
Institute, a consultant from Salt Lake City, and Sigurd Olson, a 
naturalist and writer, referred to as a NPS collaborator (Hartzog memo, 
undated). 
The study team faced several controversial issues. Among the key 
issues the team dealt with were: the amount of the Park to be 
designated as wilderness under the Wilderness Act; the idea of building 
bypass roads around high concentration areas such as Lake, Old Faithful, 
and West Thumb; the concept of removing or limiting overnight 
accommodations within the Park; the installation of a mass transit 
system in the Park; the elimination of inappropriate facilities or 
services; and the problem of Grant Village (Anderson, pers. comm.). 
Page 95 
Public hearings held in surrounding communities in 1972 brought out 
various opinions about the proposed master plan. In Livingston, MT, 
concessioners complained that they had not been conslulted in the 
planning process and that a mass transit system would be too costly, 
while conservation groups present advocated removal of overnight 
facilities (Billings Gazette, 1972). The Denver Post (Wynkoop, 1972) 
proclaimed that Mission 66 was "dead", and that at the hearing in 
Jackson, WY, the new master plan proposals emphasized preservation. 
According to the Post the Governor of Wyoming and state and civic 
business leaders did not like the plan's preservation orientation and 
its "new direction" for the Park. They felt that the Wyoming tourism 
industry was at stake, and objected to what they perceived as proposals 
to restrict automobile use in the Park. Most chambers of commerce in 
surrounding communities favored the completion of Grant Village 
(Anderson, pers. comm.), possibly because they felt that having more 
facilities within the Park would help draw more tourists to the region. 
Meanwhile, the Park Service was planning for Yellowstone's 
centennial that same year, and the Park became the subject of much 
public debate over what was wrong with the Park and what should be done 
to preserve it for another century. In Billings, MT, a Montana 
Congressman called for development of the Park's "fringe areas" and 
attacked YPCO for allowing the facilities within the Park to deteriorate 
(Sullivan, 1972). Huser (1972) argued that, as had been historically 
true, the three states surrounding the Park were pushing for more use, 
although the Park had reached a point of overuse. Huser favored 
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restricting automobile use and developing a mass transit system. 
In 1973, the final version of the Yellowstone Master Plan (YMP) was 
completed, and a year later it was approved (NPS Advisory Board (1), 
undated). The new master plan (USDI, 1974) was different from previous 
plans; instead of being a detailed document that specifically 
identified future plans and development, it was a "conceptual document" 
which outlined in broad terms the future direction of the Park's 
management (Barbee, pers. comm.) It was not intended to tie the NPS 
down to specific actions, but rather was intended to provide general 
guidance under which there was much opportunity for change (Barbee, 
pers. comm.). The new master plan left a substantial amount of 
discretion to future administrators, and was intended to provide for 
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 
which mandated federal agencies to give opportunities for public 
involvement in planning and to determine environmental consequences of 
potential management actions. 
The new Yellowstone Master Plan reflected the attitudes prevalent 
at the time. It was written during the environmental revolution and 
restated the "preservation and use" mandate of the Service "in terms of 
contemporary connotations" (USDI, 1974): 
To perpetuate the natural ecosystems within the park iji 
as near pristine conditions as possible for their 
inspirational» educational, cultural, and scientific values 
for this and future generations. 
The YMP called for regional planning with the US Forest Service, state 
agencies, and surrounding communities. It perpetuated the M66 concept 
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of removing roads and facilities from fragile and impacted areas, but 
the final plan did not call for the installation of a mass transit 
system or a one-way traffic system on the lower-loop road as had been 
proposed. It also "backed off" from calling for the removal of all 
overnight facilities within the Park, but instead called for a ceiling 
of 8,300 pillows (total overnight guest capacity in cabins, hotels, and 
trailer parks, but excluding campgrounds) within the Park (Anderson, 
pers. comm.) and development of the gateway communities surrounding the 
Park's to provide accommodations for increasing numbers of park 
visitors. The Master Plan stated that with guest ceilings established 
within the Park: 
Ultimately freed from having to provide the mass terminal 
creature-comfort facilities and services within its prime 
resource zone, Yellowstone National Park can begin to expand 
its interpretive,educational, and environmental functions. 
Anderson had of course favored no further development at Grant Village, 
but was outvoted by other members of the study team, as well as by the 
Director (Anderson, pers. comm.). However, rather than perpetuating 
the Mission 66 plan of constructing Grant as part of the triad of Canyon 
Village, Firehole Village, and Grant Village to replace facilities 
removed from the Canyon rim, Old Faithful, and West Thumb, respectively, 
the new Master Plan advocated completion of Grant as an immediate 
replacement of West Thumb and a future replacement for overnight 
facilities at Old Faithful and Fishing Bridge (to be removed when the 
situation permitted). Therefore, because Grant Village had already been 
partially constructed at considerable expense to the federal government, 
rather than abandoning the project as part of obsolete planning the 
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Master Plan attempted to adapt the project to help achieve the new goals 
of limiting overnight use and rehabilitating impacted areas. The desire 
to remove facilities from Fishing Bridge came about because of 
recognition of the importance of the area around the Lake outlet as 
grizzly bear habitat. 
THE 1976 YELLOWSTONE CONCESSIONS STUDY 
When the Master Plan was approved in 1974, the Grant Village 
project was at essentially the same standstill it had been in 1969. 
Although the marina, visitor center, and gas station were open to the 
public, there was still no lodging facilities built and little chance of 
YPCO building any in the foreseeable future. Then, in 1975 John 
Townsley replaced Anderson as Superintendent, and was sent to the Park 
with "pretty specific directions" from the Director to find a solution 
to concessioner problems (Anzelmo, pers. comm.). By this time the 
Service was not only upset by General Host's refusal to fulfill its 
contractual agreement to build Grant Village, but also by the numbers of 
complaints about poor service from visitors and from surrounding 
communities whose economies are dependent upon Park visitation (Anzelmo, 
pers. comm.). 
The Service established a study team in 1976 to conduct an 
extensive review of YPCO (USDI, 1976). The study team's report (USDI, 
1976) was harshly critical of almost every aspect of the company's 
operation; their findings were quite similar to those of Dr. Wilson's 
study of the old YPCO thirteen years earlier. Among the basic comments 
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of the 1976 review: 
Management in the Yellowstone Park Company is fragmented, 
lacks sufficient experience in operations, and, therefore, 
does not respond adequately or consistently to visitor needs. 
The management cannot respond to visitor needs because the 
company is not oriented to service to the public, but only to 
the generation of profit dollars. 
Currently, executive bonuses are being paid at an increasing 
rate, presumably as a reward for the production of increased 
profits, while the services and facilities being provided in 
the park are deteriorating. The company reacts only to 
pressure, and cannot seem to work out long-range solutions to 
its problems. There is a reasonable profit generated by the 
company, not because of good service or quality facilities, 
but because of the thousands of visitors who enter Yellowstone 
National Park and have no other place to eat or sleep. 
Without a captive audience, and in a competitive situation 
outside of the park environment, the company could not survive 
as it is presently constituted. 
The seasonal employees of the Yellowstone Park Company are not 
treated equitably. They are paid low wages, work long hours, 
are housed in inadequate quarters, are not properly trained, 
have poor supervision, are fed unprofessionally prepared food 
in unpleasant, unclean staffeterias, and do not have 
supervisory or managerial support in their daily work.... 
Food service is usually slow, and employees are not aware of, 
or responsive to, basic needs. Sanitation standards are below 
the standards of many public health departments and large 
hospitality companies.... 
Lodging in the park is characterized by slow service at the 
front desk and poorly furnished, ill-maintained sleeping 
quarters....There are no apparent standards for maid service. 
Generally, the lodging facilities are poorly decorated, poorly 
furnished and equipped, poorly lighted, poorly cleaned, poorly 
heated and insulated, and merely tolerated by the typical park 
visitor.... 
Most facilities throughout the park show extensive signs of 
advanced age and improper maintenance.... 
In short, the Yellowstone Park Company is providing to the 
visitor unacceptable facilities and services. These problems 
cannot be solved with the current management structure, 
attitude, and emphasis. The company, if it continues to exist 
in Yellowstone, must undergo a complete overhaul, both in 
management philosophy and structure, and in facilities and 
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facility presentation. 
The study team admitted that "in light of existing developed areas in 
the park, it is not economically feasible for the concessioner to 
develop Grant Village", and therefore recommended that the NPS "purchase 
the possessory interest in all concession-owned buildings at Grant 
Village", begin building "low-cost shelter units, cottages, public 
buildings, and related site work", and lease back all, or part, of the 
facilities to a concessioner. The study team held the positions that: 
The Yellowstone Park Company and its owners, the General Host 
Corporation, have not met their contractual commitments with 
respect to facility development. 
The development of new facilities at Grant Village should be 
the responsibility of the Government. 
The contract, without renewal, expires on September 30, 1977, 
due to non-compliance by the concessioner. 
The National Park Service is willing to extend the contract 
for an additional twenty years...if the concessioner and the 
parent corporation will agree to the renovation program and 
the managerial and operational improvements specified in this 
report. 
The company is in violation of its contract by giving 
unsatisfactory service. 
The development to be built by the government, as proposed by the study 
team, was to consist of "400 lodging units, a restaurant, concessioner 
dormitories, utilities roads and related development at a net cost of 
$14,782,000" (NPS Advisory Board (2), undated). 
By 1979 the Park Service, citing poor service to the public and 
failure to develop Grant, finally convinced Congress to appropriate 
$19.9 million for government purchase of the facilities owned by General 
Host, and thus eliminated their possessory interest (Anzelmo, pers. 
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comm.)* General Host lost their lease at the end of the 1979 summer 
season, and a subsidiary of Trans World Airlines, TWA Services, was 
granted a two-year interim contract for the concessions. 
THE GRANT VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT PLAN 
Also in 1979, in accordance with NEPA, the NPS issued the 
Environmental Assessment and Preferred Alternative for the Grant Village 
Development Concept Plan (USDI, 1979). The Preferred Alternative cited 
Grant Village as the solution of "two pressing problems" in Yellowstone, 
the "removal of development from environmentally sensitive areas", and 
"management of traffic on the Grand Loop Road". The Preferred 
Alternative called for: 
Locating 700 new lodging units at Grant Village [which] is 
intended to compensate for overnight accommodations removed 
from West Thumb and to allow the eventual removal of lodging 
from Fishing Bridge and Old Faithful,... 
The Plan called for multiunit buildings, with a maximum of 100 units per 
building and interior access to individual rooms. The buildings were 
not to be higher than three stories, and each room was to have at least 
a half-bath. Construction was to be carried out in phases. Phase 1A 
was to consist of construction of 100 to 200 units, and had already been 
planned prior to the writing of the preferred alternative. The rest of 
Phase 1 was to be the construction of employee dormitories, roads and 
parking, and a restaurant. Phase 2 was to consist of upgrading the 
sewage system. Phase 3 was to be construction of 200 more lodging 
units, a second restaurant, and support facilities. Phase 4 was the 
construction of 200 to 300 more lodging units. The Park Service was to 
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"pay all costs and...make new facilities available to the concessioner 
at no expense to them". Thus the Service, in order to complete the 
project, was willing to construct the facilities with federal money. 
This proposal alleviated the concessioner complaint that construction 
and maintenance costs made Grant Village unfeasible. It should be noted 
that the units called for were no longer a variety of cabins ranging 
from luxury to shelter, but were to be multiunit buildings with each 
room having some bath facilities. 
The Plan stated that "[t]he primary interpretive theme at Grant 
Village will continue to be the wilderness threshold experience". Grant 
Village was to be a starting point for those wishing to hike out into 
the southern backcountry of the Park. However, the US Fish and Wildlife 
Service, in their biological opinion of the Preferred Alternative, 
expressed concern for the impact the completion of Grant Village would 
have on the grizzly bear. Five cutthroat trout spawning streams flow 
through the developed area, and bears had traditionally frequented the 
area in spring in search of trout. The Fish and Wildlife Service 
stated: 
It is our biological opinion that the proposed development 
within Grant Village is not likely to jeopardize the continued 
existence of the grizzly bear. However, we question the need 
and justification for such extensive commercial development 
within occupied grizzly habitat and believe that adverse 
impacts to the bear will result, although they may be at a 
level that does not constitute jeopardy to the species. We 
also believe the project will negate many of the benefits 
acquired through the phaseout of facilities at Fishing Bridge 
and view such a "trade-off" as an unfavorable solution to a 
wildlife conflict that, with development of Grant Village, 
will likely be duplicated rather than eliminated (USDI, 1979). 
Dr. Richard Knight, head of the Interagency Grizzly Study Team which is 
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responsible for grizzly research in the Yellowstone ecosystem, was 
vehemently critical of both the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park 
Service. He is quoted as stating (McNamee, 1982): 
^ [T]he habitat encroachment is always considered by the 
Fish and Wildlife Service item by item. They're always 
saying, no, this won't jeopardize the bear by itself. But 
what about the cumulative effect of five or six developments? 
They won't address that. Yellowstone Village is a big real 
estate development right in the middle of where there used to 
be lots of bears. Then you've got Ski Yellowstone, and that 
by itself wouldn't wipe out the bears— just take a few more. 
And right here in the park, twenty to twenty-eight million 
dollars' worth of development at Grant Village is coming, 
sitting on top of five Yellowstone Lake spawning 
streams—some of the most heavily used grizzly habitat we've 
got. 
In August 1980 a meeting was held at Grant Village including the 
NPS Director, the Rocky Mountain Regional Director, and Superintendent 
Townsley and members of his staff (Wenk, pers. comm.). According to 
Wenk, the meeting was deemed necessary because approval for the 
completion of the Village was required at only the regional level, but 
because of its controversial nature it was decided that the Director 
should be fully informed about the project. At the meeting the Director 
gave his commitment to the development. The primary interest groups 
concerned about Grant Village at this time, besides those worried about 
the bear population, were motel owners in surrounding communities who, 
after a "disasterous" 1979 season, were now concerned that the Park 
Service was creating competition at Grant (Wenk, pers. comm.). 
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The NPS began construction of the first phase (two 50 unit 
buildings), but with the election of a new president came new attempts 
to reduce federal spending. In compliance with that policy, Secretary 
of the Interior Watt ordered that no more federal money be spent on 
development in the national parks, and thus the Grant Village project 
had another setback (Anzelmo, pers. comm.). Superintendent Townsley 
flew to Washington, DC, in an effort to find a way to complete the 
development; he had a strong personal commitment to the project, to the 
extent that its completion became "an obsession" with him, although he 
was unpopular with many of his field employees because of his commitment 
(Anzelmo, pers. comm.). 
The end result of the Secretary's decision and Townsley's efforts 
was a plan for the concessioner to finance construction of the remaining 
facilities at Grant with a percentage of their gross revenues. TWA 
Services outbid other corporations for the long-term contract (five 
years with a five year renewal option) by promising to re-invest 22 per 
cent of their gross revenues into a maintenance and improvement fund 
which would be used for facility rehabilitation and construction at 
Grant Village (Anzelmo, pers. comm.). TWA advanced seven million 
dollars toward the construction of Grant, which will be credited to the 
22 per cent fund (Wenk, pers. comm.). Should TWA's lease not be 
renewed, they will leave the Park with no possessory interest (Anzelmo, 
pers. comm.). 
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TWA is presently constructing four 50 unit buildings and a 
restaurant that will complete their part of the contractual agreement. 
For its part, the Park Service is attempting to get appropriations for 
the rehabilitation of the Grant Village marina. It has been closed 
since 1980 because wind and rough water so severely damaged the docks 
that they had to be removed. TWA is pushing for the reopening of the 
marina, feeling that it is an important factor in keeping occupancy 
levels up at the new development (King, pers. comm.). The Park Service 
hopes to reopen the marina in 1985 or 1986 (Wenk, pers. comm.). 
There has been considerable adverse comment on the architectual 
style of the Grant Village lodging facilities. People often refer to 
them as "condos" and have asked why the NPS did not have rustic 
buildings or cabins built. Wenk (pers. comm.) states that the decision 
was a matter of economics; the Park Service had to settle for the least 
expensive buildings, which then would cost the Park visitor less to stay 
in. 
THE CURRENT STATUS OF WEST THUMB, OLD FAITHFUL, AND FISHING BRIDGE 
The development of Grant Village is predicated on the removal of 
facilities at West Thumb and Fishing Bridge, and the cabins at Old 
Faithful. In order for the project to comply with the intent of the 
1973 Master Plan, that tradeoff must occur. Jack Anderson, who was 
never a strong advocate of the project, feels that removal of all the 
intended facilities is necessary to make Grant an acceptable development 
(Anderson, pers. comm.). Dan Wenk, the current Landscape Architect for 
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the NPS in Yellowstone, expressed his personal opinion: 
Grant Village is the right move only if three things 
happen: that we can continue to get out of Old Faithful, we 
continue to get out of West Thumb, and we continue to get out 
of Fishing Bridge. If those three things don't happen, then 
it's a giant mistake. (Wenk, pers. comm.) 
Therefore, with so much importance being placed on Grant Village as only 
a part of an overall effort on the part of the Park Service to 
dramatically change the overnight use of the Park, it is important to 
examine the current status of the three developments involved in the 
Grant Village tradeoff. 
The facilities at West Thumb are to be removed in the Fall of 1984, 
but Hamilton Stores wants to keep their store open there until all 700 
units are built at Grant Village (Wenk, pers. comm.). The NPS has not 
made a decision about that store at this time. Further development at 
Grant will probably not occur until a new concession contract is 
negotiated after the current one expires in ten years (Wenk, pers. 
comm.). Thus, if Hamilton is allowed to keep the store at West Thumb 
until Grant is complete, it will be open for several more years. 
After issuing an environmental assessment and holding public 
hearings to discuss alternatives as part of the NEPA process, the Park 
Service issued a draft Development Concept Plan for Old Faithful in 
February 1984. The Plan called for removing several facilities from the 
Old Faithful area, including all cabins (USDI, 1984). Most of the 
cabins are scheduled to be removed at the end of the 1984 season (King, 
pers. comm.); those needed for employee housing will remain until new 
housing can be provided in the employee housing area (Wenk, pers. 
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comm.). The cabin removal is essentially a one-to-one tradeoff for the 
opening of lodging facilities at Grant; 326 cabins for 300 new units 
(Wenk, pers. comm.). Opposition to the cabin removal comes primarily 
from historic preservation groups who claim that the cabins have 
historic value, and from members of the public who believe the 
traditional experience of staying in the Old Faithful cabins is one 
which should be perpetuated (Wenk, pers. comm.). Concessioners are 
interested to the extent that they feel a segment of the public will no 
longer have their interests served, but they do not really consider the 
Old Faithful cabins an issue (Wenk, pers. comm.). 
Presently the Park Service is developing a Lake Area Development 
Concept Plan. In the summer of 1983 several public meetings (termed 
"workshops" by the NPS) were held in the Park and in surrounding 
communities. At those workshops, NPS representatives presented 
alternatives for future planning for the Lake-Fishing Bridge-Bridge Bay 
area. The alternatives dealt with several issues: removal of some 
facilities, building new facilities, relocating some facilities, and 
building new roads and closing others. However, the most important 
issue at those workshops seemed to be the future of the recreational 
vehicle campground at Fishing Bridge. The workshops were very biased 
(Barbee, pers. comm.), with the recreational vehicle constituency and 
Hamilton Stores usually heavily represented. As far as the RV group was 
concerned, the issue is one of having RV camping facilities within 
Yellowstone Park. Many preferred that the existing RV campground remain 
at Fishing Bridge, but their main concern was that the facilities be 
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present somewhere within the Park (Wenk, pers. comm.). They strongly 
opposed what they felt were NPS efforts to force them to stay in the 
"condos" at Grant in order to benefit TWA Services. Hamilton Stores is 
interested in the RV park because their store at Fishing Bridge is 
dependent on the people who stay there. Even if the NPS were to allow 
Hamilton to keep the store there, without the RV park profits at the 
store would suffer considerably. The other concessioner, TWA Services, 
wrote to members of Congress in the context of speaking for the public 
interest suggesting that the RV park at Fishing Bridge was a service 
which, if eliminated, would deprive certain members of the public of the 
experience they desired in Yellowstone (Wenk, pers. comm.). The RV 
constituency is represented by regional and national recreational 
vehicle organizations such as the Good Sam Club. These organizations 
have worked at the national level to protect their constituents' 
interests. 
At a workshop in Cody, WY, Hamilton Stores was again well-
represented. Also, the business community of Cody firmly believes that 
the facilities at Fishing Bridge are essential to their economy. The 
highway through Cody continues through Yellowstone's east entrance and 
leads directly to Fishing Bridge; people in Cody feel that the Fishing 
Bridge development is a primary reason for tourists to enter the Park 
from the east entrance, and that removal of the facilities will "destroy 
the economic viability of their tourist trade" (Wenk, pers. comm.). US 
Senator Alan Simpson is from Cody (Wenk, pers. comm.) and therefore 
provides a sympathetic ear in the senate for the people of Cody. 
Page 109 
Environmental groups, on the other hand, have been supportive of 
the NPS proposal at Fishing Bridge. The plight of the grizzly bear 
population in Yellowstone has become a highly visible issue in the 
popular media recently, and environmentalists feel that returning the 
Fishing Bridge area to its natural condition is important to the 
survival of the bear in the Yellowstone ecosystem. 
Because of the "intense" interest on the part of the public, 
special interest groups, and Congressional delegations, who "brought a 
lot of pressure" on the Park Service, the Service in conjunction with 
the Fish and Wildlife Service reviewed the data that led to the Fishing 
Bridge decision, and presented the findings to the Director, who then 
made the final decision to remove the facilities (Wenk, pers. comm.). 
The review was essentially an attempt to provide a sound basis for the 
Park Service's argument that the Fishing Bridge area is extremely 
important habitat for the Yellowstone grizzly bear population. 
The end result of the debate could have been that both Fishing 
Bridge and Grant Village would have remained as operating locations. 
Because of strong opinions on both sides of the issue the final decision 
was probably based more on political considerations then on biological 
evidence (Wenk, pers. comm.). 
Robert Barbee succeeded the late John Townsley as Yellowstone 
Superintendent in 1983. As Wenk (pers. comm.) stated, Barbee "arrived 
for the last scene of the last act of the play" at Grant Village. 
Barbee (pers. comm.) stated his thoughts on the development: "I'm not 
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an apologist for Grant Village. I'm accepting that it's there. It 
offers us the opportunity to do some things that the Service has wanted 
to accomplish." He was referring to the removal of facilities at Fishing 
Bridge, Old Faithful, and West Thumb; the decisions made concerning 
those facilities will ultimately be one which he will have to deal with, 
and because of their controversial nature, he will undoubtedly draw the 
wrath of the special interest groups that disagree with that decision. 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
CONCLUSIONS 
THE MERITS OF GRANT VILLAGE 
Upon superficial examination the Grant Village development today 
seems to be an outdated response to visitation demands in Yellowstone 
Park, and unfortunately, too many people have based their arguments 
against the development on such examination. Closer study of the 
project makes the complexity of the issues surrounding it more apparent 
and clarifies the purpose the development is supposed to serve. 
The project was begun in an era of extreme anthropocentric 
philosophy in the National Park Service, and has survived throughout 
years of relatively dramatic change in the Service's philosophy toward 
biocentrism. The Leopold Report of 1963 served to steer the Service 
toward a biocentric course, but the marinas at Grant and Bridge Bay, 
which the Report stated were inconsistent with the purpose of national 
parks, were already under construction when the Report was published. 
The Report therefore had little direct impact on the project, but it and 
subsequent post-Mission 66 studies, reports, and articles (such as the 
Darling-Eichhorn study sponsored by the Conservation Foundation) did 
serve to help lead national park policy away from the anthropocentrism 
that dominated M66. The master plan process instituted by the NPS in 
the mid-1960s was in a part a response to those efforts; the process 
was conceived as a re-adjustment of M66 planning to bring it more in 
line with biocentric goals, and the Yellowstone Master Plan that 
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resulted from that process reflected many of the changing attitudes 
toward the national parks that had arisen during the environmental 
revolution. Instead of trying to accommodate increasing recreational 
use of the parks, the new Master Plan sought to place a limit on the 
number of overnight accommodations, and therefore reflected the newly 
popular belief that national parks, like the Earth's environment, had a 
limit to the amount of use they could withstand without being destroyed. 
The Master Plan changed Grant Village from being one part of a 
triad of major visitor facilities developments planned during M66 to 
replace and expand facilities located in fragile or impacted areas to 
being a replacement for facilities at three impacted areas. Grant was 
seen as a way to help reduce impacts at three important areas by 
relocating equivalent facilities without impacting an additional 
pristine area. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to find anyone in the Park 
Service in Yellowstone today who is fond of the massive, urban-looking 
development at Canyon Village, and it is doubtful that many feel more 
charitable toward the development at Grant. But as Superintendent 
Barbee suggested, it does offer the Service the opportunity to 
accomplish some desired goals. Removal of all overnight facilities in 
Yellowstone was not politically feasible when the new Master Plan was 
written, and is not feasible today. Given that fact, a compromise 
tradeoff to get facilities removed from some fragile areas was probably 
the only way to eliminate impacts caused by overnight use at those 
areas. Although the merits of the tradeoff can be questioned on several 
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grounds, particularly the grizzly issue, Grant Village was probably the 
only resolution to several conflicts (including the bears, visitor 
impacts on fragile areas, improvement of visitor facilities) that was 
economically and politically viable. In the long term, should the 
political climate change so that overnight facilities could be further 
reduced within the Park, and should the NPS desire to do so, Grant 
Village could be reduced or eliminated much more easily than could 
several developments. Thus, Grant Village could serve as an 
intermediate stage in a long term effort to remove overnight facilities 
from the Park. 
Therefore, while Grant is seen by many to be incorporating an 
outdated management philosophy that was rejected several years earlier, 
it can be viewed as an attempt by the NPS to bring Yellowstone Park 
planning more in line, within political constraints, with the broad 
biocentric goals of national park policy by using an area already 
partially developed under the anthropocentric philosophy to accomplish 
some biocentric objectives. Hence, the Grant Village plan today must be 
looked at as part of an overall effort to bring the Park's management 
more in line with the current biocentric management philosophy, and 
within that context the development does have beneficial aspects for the 
Yellowstone ecosystem. 
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THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF GRANT VILLAGE 
Grant Village has several negative aspects which help make the 
project controversial, and also limit its value as a tradeoff for 
biocentric purposes. One negative aspect which has plagued the project 
from its inception is its poor location. Haines (pers. comm.) stated 
that, had the planning remained at the Park level instead of being taken 
over by the Service's Western Office of Design and Construction, 
development would not have been at the present location. Haines felt 
the present location was a bad choice because the area gets little sun, 
has cold, damp nights, and water circulation in the Thumb area of the 
Lake is poor, resulting in a danger of water pollution in the Village's 
water supply, as well as the Lake itself. Anderson (pers. comm.) also 
cited several reasons that he felt the location was poor: 
I felt that Grant Village was a mistake from the 
standpoint of a developed area. Number one, it is infested 
with mosquitoes half of the summer. Number two, it is the 
highest snow load area in the park, literally; it is the 
first to close, the last to open. You're sitting in a bog 
down there. It was also...historically a grizzly breeding 
area....It isn't an area...where you want to take your family 
and stay a week or two. 
Garrison stated that Grant Village was planned as a "wilderness 
takeoff point" and would be a starting point for canoe trips on 
Yellowstone Lake, but anyone familiar with the West Thumb of the lake 
knows that wind makes it too rough for canoes practically every day of 
the summer. Also, if the primary clientele was to be canoeists, clearly 
the elaborate marina that exists today would not have been built. Wind 
and wave damage to the marina's docks caused its closure in 1980, which 
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is further evidence that the site for the Village was poorly chosen, but 
both the NPS and TWA consider the marina important to attract visitors 
to the development. Hence, at a time when the Park Service would seem 
to have an opportunity to make Yellowstone management more in line with 
the policies of the Leopold Report, it is continuing to perpetuate 
Mission 66-type activities by rehabilitating the Grant Village marina. 
The bear issue is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Grant 
Village. The lack of enthusiasm expressed by the Fish and Wildlife 
Service and Dr. Knight for the Fishing Bridge tradeoff cause one to 
question how much the bears will actually benefit. Certainly the worst 
possibility as far as the bear population is concerned would be for both 
Fishing Bridge and Grant to provide overnight accommodations. 
THE BIOCENTRIC ARGUMENT 
In studying the Grant Village project it becomes apparent that 
local and regional interests have assumed a very important role in the 
Yellowstone Park policy process, and in some instances have forced 
compromises and tradeoffs which have prevented Park policies from fully 
complying with the stated goals of park policy at the national level. 
The regional economic interests are especially powerful. Their power is 
due to the fact that the economy of a three-state region is extensively 
dependent on Park visitation. Regional non-economic interests are also 
powerful, as are Park concessioners, who are no longer small family-run 
operations, but are now corporate enterprises. 
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Because these interest groups generally desire increased Park 
visitation, or at least are against restrictions on what they consider 
desirable uses, their arguments can be placed in the anthropocentric end 
of the management spectrum, and they have a fairly viable foundation in 
law and tradition for their anthropocentric arguments. Yellowstone was 
established for essentially anthropocentric reasons, and early tourists 
were largely wealthy Easterners seeking the luxury of the portal 
experience. The first NPS director freely encouraged anthropocentric 
uses of the parks, and played a major role in the construction of luxury 
hotels which catered to the portal tourist. The Mission 66 program was 
an anthropocentric answer to the post-World War II recreation boom; the 
facilities built during that program will continue to exist for several 
years, and by their presence and use will perpetuate the convenience-
oriented types of use which reflect anthropocentric ideals. The 
Concessions Policy Act of 1965 gave legal strength to the concessioners' 
anthropocentrism by putting responsibility for their opportunity to 
realize profits on the Park Service. Under the current presidential 
administration anthropocentric management has received important support 
from the Interior Department, with the Secretary offering his sympathies 
to concessioner interests. Thus, the anthropocentric argument is fairly 
strong. 
However, the biocentric argument is much stronger; it has its 
basis in several laws dealing with the parks, as well as in the 
philosophy of the preservation movement that grew in this century, 
reached a peak during the environmental revolution of the 1970s, and has 
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been an essential factor in the evolution of national park policy. The 
legal basis began with the Yellowstone Act of 1872 which included the 
biocentric goal of preserving all "natural curiosities...in their 
natural condition". The National Park Service Act of 1916 also had the 
biocentric goal to "conserve the scenery and the natural and historic 
objects and the wildlife", and the Lane Letter went further by 
establishing as the first goal of the Service "that the national parks 
must be maintained in absolutely unimpaired form". That statement 
perhaps best expresses the biocentric basis of the first NPS director's 
philosophy. The Leopold Report of 1963 became undoubtedly the most 
concise biocentric statement of policy to this day. It refuted the 
anthropocentric answer to the post-war crush of park visitors, and made 
it clear that, as Haines (pers. comm.) stated, the M66 planners' 
"crystal ball was off" when they tried to plan for future management of 
the parks. 
The biocentric philosophy for national park management has also 
enjoyed a growing popular support. The first suggestions for 
establishment of national parks were essentially biocentric, although at 
the time they did not generate public interest. By the late nineteenth 
century, however, Olmsted helped popularize biocentric management when 
he stated that parks should be maintained in as natural condition as 
possible with only necessary, unobtrusive visitor facilities provided. 
He believed that facilities and services provided within parks should 
not be attractions in themselves. In the early twentieth century John 
Muir generated a great deal of public support for the biocentric park 
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philosophy, and when the environmental revolution of the 1960s and 1970s 
arose, his writings enjoyed a renewed popularity. Several writers of 
that revolution, such as Edward Abbey, wrote strongly of the need for 
biocentric management, and their ideas were widely accepted. In the 
1980s, Sax has spoken eloquently for the need for park visitors to enjoy 
the parks unrestrained by conventional services provided by 
concessioners. He advocated the elimination of "resort"-style 
convenience-oriented recreation in the parks. 
It can be argued that the biocentrism which grew to dominate 
national park policy in the late 1960s is only a phase which was popular 
during the enviromental revolution but is coming to an end in this era 
of "new conservatism". Perhaps James Watt did signal the beginning of 
an era when the American people will favor maximum resource development 
and reject preservationist biocentric ideals as incompatible with the 
needs of modern American society. That prospect seems highly unlikely 
because the biocentric philosophy that exists within the National Park 
Service policy today arose out of the preservationist ideas first voiced 
in the United States over 150 years ago, and the preservation movement 
has grown since then as American society has progressed. The movement 
grew in the late nineteenth century because the public began to realize 
that the continent's natural resources are finite, and came of age when 
science came to more fully understand the ecological interdependence of 
all living things. For the national parks, the implication is that park 
visitors, instead of merely enjoying the parks as portal tourists, will 
become more sensitive to ecological problems created by altering the 
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park environment. They will be more aware that actions which affect one 
aspect of a park may have undesirable impacts on other aspects which may 
be considered essential to the park experience; therefore the 
biocentric philosophy, which emphasizes the maintenance of naturally 
occurring environmental processes, is most likely to be desired by more 
park visitors in the future. 
While the Third Wave theory does not deal with biocentrism or 
anthropocentrism in leisure activities, it does tend to support the idea 
that biocentric recreation will continue to gain in popularity. The 
portal tourism prevalent in the past century is emblematic of the 
structured, convenience- and entertainment- oriented recreation of the 
Second Wave. The contemplative, educational, and self-actualizing forms 
of recreation favored by biocentrists are emblematic of the Third Wave. 
Hence, for those who subscribe to Toffler's theory, the biocentric 
argument for national parks would seem to be the most farsighted. 
IDEALISM VS. REALISM 
Many may contend that the Leopold Report was not meant to be given 
the importance it has been given in this paper. Some would assert that 
it is only a broad guideline for national park management. Others would 
argue that it was meant to deal only with resource issues. However, the 
authors of the Report clearly felt that recreational issues cannot be 
separated from resource issues. The significant contribution of the 
Report was that it stressed the concept of integrated park management, 
and that the goal of providing recreational opportunities should be 
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subordinate to preserving ecosystems. It is the Report's emphasis on 
preserving ecosystems that makes it powerful because that makes 
management consider more than just insuring that visitors can see 
unspoiled scenery; it must insure that visitor use will not disrupt the 
natural system. 
The goals of the Leopold Report are ideals the Service was directed 
to seek to achieve, but as both former Superintendent Anderson and 
present Superintendent Barbee stated, "Sometimes you have to be a 
realist" (pers. coirans.). The national parks are a highly visible, 
extremely popular institution in American culture which also have 
significant economic value to several interest groups. Thus, decisions 
made in the parks, especially a Park as famous as Yellowstone, are 
invariably very political. As Barbee (pers. comm.) stated: 
^ [I]n every national park there is a constellation of 
i' special interest groups that surround it...there are certain 
traditional kinds of uses that exist there that one more or 
less accepts as part of the picture. They don't seem to 
' ̂  v% materially affect the entire park and so one has to ask the 
questions: How far do you want to go? How pure do you want 
to get? At what cost do you want to pursue that, politically 
and so on? 
Many of these special interests are not concerned with the philosophical 
basis for policy formation, be it anthropocentric or biocentric, but are 
only concerned with how the implementation of various policies will 
affect them. This fact makes these interests especially difficult for 
the NPS to deal with because they are unwilling to look at the overall 
goals of national park management. 
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Included in this type of special interests are individuals and 
groups who regularly patronize a particular park and, because of their 
political connections, are able to either change policy or prevent its 
implementation, at least to the extent that it would affect them and 
their activities. Because of the difficulty in identifying them and 
measuring their influence on the policy process they are beyond the 
scope of this study. Nevertheless they do exist, and anyone familiar 
with Yellowstone can identify some of them; for although their power is 
informal, they are well-known to Park employees, are treated with 
deference, and are often allowed special privileges or considerations. 
For examples of this type of special interest, one could study Bridge 
Bay Marina, where several wealthy people, primarily from the surrounding 
region, rent summer-long dock space season after season; many of them 
live on their boats for the entire season, which tends to give the 
marina the atmosphere of a private yacht club. Some of these people are 
friends of state or national politicians, and are very vocal about 
fishing and boating restrictions on the Lake. The degree to which these 
people have an effect on Park policy in any important sense is quite 
difficult to determine, but the fact that they do have an effect is very 
important to recognize in order to understand the realities of national 
park management. 
Congress, in the Concessions Policy Act, allowed for these 
political considerations when it failed to define "necessary and 
appropriate" facilities and services in national parks. Consequently, 
those terms are usually defined on a case-by-case basis in the political 
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arena. Because of the political power of the special interests, the 
Park Service is placed in a position of seeking compromises, which some 
refer to as "the balance of preservation and use". However, that label 
implies that preservationists are opposed to any use, which is not the 
case. Preservation interests only seek to narrow the definition of the 
purpose of the parks to in order to exclude what they consider 
inappropriate uses. The balance is actually between those interests 
favoring a narrow set of biocentric uses and those favoring a wide range 
of uses, including anthropocentric uses. 
COMPROMISES IN BIOCENTRIC MANAGEMENT 
In theory the preservationists and the Park Service are on the 
biocentric side, but in reality, because of its vague legal direction 
and the power of the anthropocentric interests, the NPS is more of a 
mediator who tries to accommodate the wishes of both sides by striking 
compromises between them in its management decisions. The tradeoff of 
Fishing Bridge for Grant Village is one such compromise. 
The contractual agreement between the NPS and TWA Services in 
Yellowstone can also be viewed as a compromise between biocentric and 
anthropocentric interests, and it is a compromise with dangerous 
potential. The Park Service benefits from the agreement by insuring the 
improvement of many of the Park's deteriorated facilities and the 
construction of Grant Village which would then allow the achievement of 
the biocentric goals of removing the facilities at Fishing Bridge, West 
Thumb, and Old Faithful in order to restore impacted thermal areas and 
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grizzly bear habitat. TWA benefits by having to re-invest only a 
specified percentage of their revenues into these projects. However, 
the agreement is a Catch-22. In order for the NPS to achieve its 
desired biocentric goals, it must rely on capital provided by TWA. 
Therefore, in order to guarantee enough capital to accomplish those 
goals, the Service is in the position of helping TWA maximize profits. 
TWA, in turn, pushes to expand the services it provides in order to 
increase revenues. Frequently the Park Service is faced with allowing 
TWA to provide anthropocentric services in order to accomplish 
biocentric goals. 
TWA's position as a concessioner and economic interest is perfectly 
clear; they are in business in the Park to generate profits by serving 
Park visitors. They cannot be expected to share either the Park 
Service's point of view or its concern for biocentric management. They 
have expressed their desire to increase tourism and make Yellowstone a 
"destination resort" (Bozeman Chronicle, 1982), and have instituted such 
attractions as live bands, gourmet dining, and fast food services. The 
corporation also has a marketing division in the Park which promotes and 
advertises the Park as a resort. TWA brochures advertise boat and horse 
rides, fishing expeditions, and family cookouts in an effort to generate 
more Park tourism. Perhaps, as Superintendent Barbee (pers. comm.) 
suggested, such issues are relatively unimportant, and for the Service 
"to get all bloodied up" politically over them would distract it from 
more important things it is trying to accomplish. There is a 
significant danger, however, that in allowing (or being forced to allow) 
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such anthropocentrism within the Park, the NPS In Yellowstone is 
actually being pulled further away from the biocentric goals stated at 
the national level. 
One example of TWA's anthropocentric intentions is the recent 
renovation of Lake Hotel. The Hotel had been deteriorating for decades 
and was badly in need of repair. In the fall of 1983 TWA began a 1.7 
million dollar renovation project (Billings Gazette, 1984) with the 
stated objective of bringing back the elegant tourist experience of the 
late nineteenth century. The Billings Gazette (1984) paraphrased the 
president of TWA Services, Yellowstone: 
People may like to "rough it" on occasion, he said, but 
hot dogs and campfires don't hack it when you feel like 
getting fancy in a nice dress or suit and enjoying a meal of 
lobster and pate topped off with cognac and classy 
conversation. 
At the gala opening two weekends ago, musicians played, 
canapes were served and guests from all over the United States 
mingled to enjoy raw oysters, filet, crab and strawberries 
with champagne. 
The Lake Hotel lobby today offers a beautiful and tasteful contrast 
to the drab and shabby lobby of recent years, and by any standards is a 
great improvement. The decor of the Hotel is not the issue; the issue 
is the clientele TWA is seeking to attract. They are gearing much of 
their operation toward visitors who are more interested in being 
entertained in posh resort facilities surrounded by beautiful scenery 
than in experiencing preserved ecosystems. With an operation such as 
this the facilities and services provided become as much an attraction 
as the Park itself, and are therefore incongruous with biocentric 
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management. 
Possibly the most disturbing evidence of the direction TWA seeks to 
push Park management is a houseboat that, according to Wenk (pers. 
comm.), TWA Services purchased with money from the maintenance and 
improvement fund created by the contractual agreement with the NPS. The 
boat offers the classic "portal" experience; it has plush furniture and 
is fully carpeted, has a stereo system with outside speakers, has 
cooking facilities and a bar, and comes equipped with fishing poles and 
two guides. It is ostensibly for rent to Park visitors, but the rental 
price is prohibitive to all but the most wealthy, and therefore it has 
primarily been used as a pleasure boat for TWA executives and prominent 
people TWA wishes to entertain; in the summer of 1983 at least one 
congressman from a bordering state was treated to a complimentary day on 
Yellowstone Lake. In essence, therefore, the boat is used by the 
company as a tool with which to lobby for support for TWA initiatives in 
Yellowstone. Such activity may have been considered appropriate in the 
nineteenth century, but is inimical to today's biocentric management. 
Furthermore, it subverts any Park Service effort to move away from 
providing such convenience-oriented, mass recreation opportunities. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT 
Examination of the evolution of national park policy and the 
history of Grant Village points out two primary problems that greatly 
affect the national parks' policy today: One, the vague legal basis 
upon which policy is made. Two, the failure of the National Park 
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Service to identify a clientele for whom it will seek to manage. The 
second problem to a great extent follows from the first problem. 
The vague legal basis. From the beginning of the national parks 
Congress has been unwilling to form a concise legal basis for park 
management. The reason is largely due to the fact that the parks were 
not established as an organized system with a common purpose and policy, 
but were established individually with individual management 
prescriptions; a central management agency was not formed until after 
several parks had been established, and it was given only a broad 
mandate to both preserve the parks and provide for their use by the 
public. Also, units established for recreational and historical 
purposes were added to the system, further confusing management goals. 
Early on the Park Service made every attempt to generate park use, 
and these efforts were so successful that most of the major parks became 
surrounded by communities dependent on park tourism. Because of the 
strength these regional interests have gained as park visitation grew, 
they have been very important in keeping tourism a major consideration 
in park policy. Efforts by preservationist interests to strengthen the 
preservation mandate of the Service have been frequently thwarted by 
members of Congress sympathetic to these interests. Language in 
national park legislation is generally broad enough to allow several 
interpretations. 
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If, as this paper has argued, the biocentric philosophy, which 
stresses the importance of naturalness to the visitor, is the one which 
best allows the Park Service to preserve the parks for future 
generations and which will also provide the experience most desired by 
park visitors is to be fully implemented by the NPS, Congress must give 
it legal strength by more clearly defining proper park management. The 
Leopold Report is the most concise statement of how the parks should be 
managed, and Congress should give the principles expressed in the Report 
legal strength. 
The Choice of a Clientele. It has been recognized that 
recreational use of any wildland area can reach a point where both the 
resource and the experience of the recreationist are impaired; this 
point has been termed the recreational carrying capacity of the area. 
Thus, it follows that when this carrying capacity is in danger of being 
exceeded, management must act to prevent impairment of the resource or 
the recreational experience. One possible action is the establishment 
of use limits, and the Leopold Report advocated use limits as a proper 
management action when it stated, "If too many tourists crowd the 
roadways, then we should ration the tourists rather than expand the 
roadways". However, establishing carrying capacity and rationing use 
are complex problems. As Shreyer (1979) stated, "Carrying capacity is a 
tool to attain an outcome, rather than an inherent characteristic of a 
recreation resource". Therefore, it "is a social cost imposed upon 
society in order to attain other ends". Those ends may include 
preservation of a desired recreational experience. Shreyer stated that 
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applying recreational use limitations is actually a resource allocation 
problem in which a certain desired clientele whose experiential goals 
are most in line with management goals benefit from management actions, 
while those whose goals are in opposition to management goals suffer. 
The National Park Service has historically been unwilling or 
unable, because of political pressures, to identify its desired 
clientele. Shreyer (1976) claims that the Park Service suffers from two 
"hang-ups": One, because the parks were established "for the benefit 
and enjoyment of the people" (the Yellowstone Act of 1872) maximizing 
visitors is considered by the Service to be equivalent to maximizing 
benefits. Two, since the parks are for all people, visitors are treated 
"as a vast, indistinguishable, amorphous mass" and the parks are managed 
for everyone. He asserts that these hang-ups lead to what he referred 
to as "lowest common denominator (LCD) management", which offers the 
visitor the "most bland and least distinctive line of values", and 
therefore "no one is really pleased very much, since they never get 
exactly what they want, but then no one is really offended enough to 
take action against" the NPS. The appeal for the management agency, 
states Shreyer, is that it is politically safe; no one is really 
offended, and therefore "they will not likely try to challenge your 
philosophies". LCD management maximizes the number of visitors who 
benefit from a particular recreational resource but does not maximize 
the benefits derived by individuals, and therefore cheats all visitors 
of quality in their recreational experience. Furthermore, it reduces 
diversity in experience because all areas managed under this strategy 
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offer the same experience. 
Because of broad statutory mandates and intense political 
pressures, the National Park Service often seems to adopt the LCD 
strategy. Policy statements, such as the Leopold Report, offer 
direction but do not give the Service the strength it needs to withstand 
objections to its biocentric management actions that come from special 
interest groups. The argument is not the appropriateness of 
anthropocentric activities, but whether they are appropriate within 
national parks. Structured, convenience-oriented, resort-style 
activities can easily be provided outside the parks. Such recreation 
can best be provided by private enterprise, and therefore should be 
provided outside the parks on private land. In the Yellowstone region 
these types of activities can be (and are) provided by resorts located 
outside the Park, such as Big Sky Resort, Chico Hot Springs, and Flagg 
Ranch. Within the Park, biocentric activities in which the Park visitor 
is allowed to engage in unstructured, contemplative forms of recreation 
(as described by Sax) should be encouraged, leaving the visitor free 
from constraints presented by concessioners and large, resort-style 
facilities. This type of recreation is most likely to be in line with 
preservation of park values and resources. The parks should provide an 
experience unique from that provided by private resorts, other federal 
lands, and state and county parks. They must be viewed as part of a 
diverse system of recreational lands, and must be expected to provide 
quality experiences for a portion of recreationists, rather than trying 
to meet all recreational demands. The parks simply cannot be all things 
Page 130 
to all people, and therefore as Sax advocated, the experience provided 
within the parks must be "unbundled" from that provided outside the 
parks. For this to happen, the parks need more legal protection and 
direction from Congress. 
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